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Abstract 
 
Female labor force participation has increased 10 percentage points 
between 1990 and 2010. This paper analyzes the possible 
determinants of this increase. Among those determinants are changes 
in education, family structure, fertility, as well as changes in 
socioeconomic environment including wages, returns to working at 
home, preferences, and technology, among others. We discuss the 
mechanisms behind those determinants by organizing the very large 
theoretical and empirical literature on the subject. We then assess the 
relative importance of the determinants in two ways. We compute 
treatment effects estimated in the literature and combine them with 
information about the changes in the causing variables. We also use 
data from household surveys and combine them with a dataset of 
determinants to find correlations in the data that reinforce or reject 
the analysis of the literature review. 
 
JEL: J22, J16, N3. 
Keywords: Female labor supply, Latin America, Determinants, 
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1. Introduction 
One of the most dramatic changes experienced in Latin America in the past half-century 
has been the annual increase in the proportion of women who decide to enter the labor 
force. The female labor supply in the region has increased by almost 10 percentage points 
in the past three decades. The increase was likely caused by a combination of several 
factors, ranging from education and fertility to technological and cultural changes. Our goal 
and main contribution is to assess the relative importance of a large set of factors that can 
explain female labor force participation dynamics in Latin America. 
Identifying the contributions of individual factors presents a complex task because an 
individual’s decision to work or not influences and is influenced by many events and 
conditions in that individual’s life. Section 2 discusses a set of basic stylized facts through 
the lens of a general and simple conceptual framework that allows us to classify the so-
called determinants of female labor supply into three categories. The first category 
concerns a group of interrelated choices that influence and are influenced by past, present, 
and anticipated labor force participation. These choices include decisions about education, 
marriage, and fertility. The second group of possible determinants is largely exogenous and 
outside the control of the individual. These determinants are socioeconomic environmental 
variables that have a central role in shaping individual-level interrelated decisions. Included 
in this category are the expected returns to education and to home production, the cultural 
context, and existing technologies in reproductive health, home production, and production 
of goods and services in the economy. The third group of determinants is less tangible and 
consists of decision-making arrangements. In theory, decisions about labor supply can be 
made individually or jointly with a spouse or family. 
Section 2 also presents a set of salient empirical regularities of female labor supply in Latin 
America. First, there was a long-term increase in female labor force participation for all 
demographic groups. Second, this increase seems to have ameliorated in recent years, 
converging at a lower level than the one observed in developed economies. Third, female 
labor force participation is converging between demographic groups. Specifically, women 
in poor households are now behaving more like women in rich households, and unskilled 
women are behaving more like skilled women. This convergence has, however, stopped in 
recent years. 
To what extent can a variety of determinants explain these empirical regularities?  In 
Section 3, we discuss the mechanisms that underlie the effects of a variety of determinants 
of female labor supply and, by doing so, we organize the results of a vast relevant empirical 
literature on the topic. The empirical studies provide credible strategies for identifying 
causal mechanisms and combine these elasticities with changes in the key variables to 
assess the extent to which they can account for the stylized facts. In Section 4, we apply 
some of these plausible theoretical and empirical explanations to the data. Using household 
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surveys from 15 countries over a 30-year period, we build a panel of socio-economic and 
demographic indicators and estimate the correlation between female labor force 
participation and covariates that are linked to the explanations identified in the literature.1 
Section 5 concludes by taking stock of the plausibility of the main long-run determinants of 
female labor supply in Latin America. 
 
2. Empirical regularities 
Section 2 begins with a summary of some basic facts about the female labor supply as 
viewed through the lens of a simple conceptual framework. In 6.1 of the Appendix, we 
provide a full set of statistics that characterize female labor force participation in Latin 
America. Here, we focus on a few simple stylized facts. Figure 1 shows long-term trends in 
the labor force participation of females aged 25–54 years. 
 
Figure 1: Female labor force participation 
Latin America and the US 
 
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys. 
The solid line shows the simple average (arithmetic mean) of female labor force 
participation in Latin America, and the light gray lines indicate the corresponding level of 
participation in individual countries. As a reference, the dashed line shows the female labor 
force participation in the US. Three important facts can be derived from these data. First, 
female labor force participation in Latin America increased from 54% in 1990 to 65% in 
2010. Second, there is some convergence among the individual countries (gray lines) in that 
countries with initially lower participation experienced faster rates of growth. Third, the 
                                                 
1 This dataset is available at www.matiasbusso.org  
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rate of growth in female labor force participation declined and almost stagnated after 2000. 
This plateau was achieved at a lower level than that in the US. As the gray lines indicate, 
only a few countries have reached the US level of participation, and in most countries, there 
is room for growth in participation. 
 
Figure 2: Interrelated decisions, choice mechanisms, and environment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Why did the female labor supply increase, and why has it stagnated? A broad conceptual 
framework can help one understand the determinants of these phenomena. The labor supply 
is related to many factors, some of which are individual-level decisions made before or 
during a person’s working age whereas other factors are outside the individual’s control. 
Figure 2 provides a schematic view of both types of factors. 
At any given time, the decisions to participate in the labor market and the number of hours 
to work involve choices that depend on the relative returns earned in the labor market 
compared to home production and the value of leisure.2 Expected wages (earnings) depend 
                                                 
2 The term “returns” has been broadly defined in this analysis. Moreover, it assumes the value of leisure is the 
same for men and women. 
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on the individual’s productivity, whereas the value of home production is a function of the 
values of providing child care and elderly care services, housework (e.g., cooking or 
cleaning), and other home-based activities, such as home administration and shopping. 
Taking preferences as given, individuals facing a higher relative return from work in the 
labor market will be more likely to participate in it.  
What do people in Latin America do when they are not working? Figure 3 shows the 
average number of hours a day used in different work activities for persons aged between 
30 and 50 years in Mexico.3  
 
Figure 3: Average time use (hours) for 30-50 years old  
Mexico 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Encuesta Nacional sobre Uso del Tiempo 
Mexico 2009 (INEGI) 
Women tend to work 12 hours a day, which is about 1 hour more than men. Women tend to 
work more hours at home (8.8 hours) than in the labor market (3.6 hours). The vast 
majority of women’s working hours are spent on housework and child care tasks and caring 
for the elderly and their spouses. Thus, it is important to examine how technological 
changes can facilitate home production (e.g., home appliances) and how types of policy 
changes subsidizing child care may influence the labor supply. This prima facie simple 
static decision is much more complex when viewed through the lens of the life course. 
From that perspective, labor market participation is associated with several important 
choices. Figure 2 shows that these decisions relate to educational investments and family 
formations. 
Individuals’ choices regarding educational investments are typically made before they can 
fully enter the labor market, and they concern the quantity, quality, and type of education 
                                                 
3 To the best of our knowledge, Mexico is the only country in Latin America that has collected time use data 
for a representative sample of men and women. 
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that individuals desire to obtain. In theory, higher and better quality of education should 
lead to more productivity and thus to higher returns in the labor market, increasing the labor 
supply. Some of the increase in educational levels could be exogenously due to 
governmental policies that reduce the cost of education and would be, therefore, unrelated 
to the (future) labor supply. However, a part of the increase in education could be the 
endogenous result of a larger proportion of women aspiring to work in the future and that 
will, therefore, obtain higher education today. 
Choices about family formation are made before and during labor force participation. 
Decisions made during labor force participation include whether and when to marry/get 
divorced, whether and when to have children, and the number of children to have. Getting 
married somewhat changes the way that decisions are made (from personal when single to 
joint when married) and can lower the labor supply of one partner if the relative wages of 
the spouses differ widely. Similarly, bearing children directly influences women’s labor 
supply during the first few months after the birth of the child. Moreover, it indirectly 
influences labor supply because it increases the opportunity cost of working outside the 
home, and in a context of different relative wage returns of partners in the household, it 
decreases the labor supply of the partner with the lower potential wage, usually the woman. 
Similar to education, observed changes in marriage and fertility rates could partly be due to 
exogenous changes in the environment, which are outside a woman’s control (e.g., 
contraception). However, they might reflect women’s endogenous decisions to participate 
in the labor force. 
It is useful to compare the ways in which women in different demographic groups (by 
education, marriage, and fertility) supply labor. Between 1990 and 2005, the participation 
rates of women in disadvantaged groups caught up to those of women with relatively more 
advantages. However, the trend apparently abated in 2005, suggesting that some aspect 
changed for the more disadvantaged women, which could explain the plateau illustrated in 
Figure 1.  
Figure 4 compares these two groups of women. Each panel in Figure 4 shows the ratio of 
female labor force participation between two groups with respect to a specific factor. The 
graph on the top left-hand side looks at education; between 1990 and 2000, the 
participation rates of the group that received less education become increasingly similar to 
those that received more education. However, by about 2000, the gap stopped closing; 
women with higher (tertiary) education showed increased participation, by 40%, in the 
labor force than those with less than a secondary education. Similarly, women whose 
husbands earned income was in the first 2 deciles of the distribution participated less than 
those whose husbands earned income was in the top 9-10 deciles (graph on the top right-
hand side). Similar to the convergence in education, convergence with respect to husbands’ 
incomes stalled in 2005. The graph on the lower left shows that women in single-mother 
households participated more than women in nuclear households (i.e., married mothers). 
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The labor force participations of these two groups seemed to converge until 2005. Last, the 
graph on the lower right presents a different pattern regarding women with school-age 
children; women with children aged 0–5 years tended to participate less than women with 
older school-age children. This gap is the only gap that increased during the period, 
suggesting that returns to home production actually increased. 
 
Figure 4: Ratio of female labor force participation 
Latin America, by groups 
 
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys. 
 
The interrelated decisions concerning education, family formation, and labor supply are 
influenced by two important factors: the arrangement in which the decision-making occurs 
and the environmental or social context in which the decisions are made. Choice 
mechanisms, or decision-making arrangements, differ in two respects. First, a decision 
about labor supply can either be made by the household as a unit (referred to as the unitary 
model) or by the spouses independently. However, scholars have rejected the unitary model 
(e.g., Lundber, Pollak, and Wales, 1997) in favor of models of intra-household bargaining. 
Second, decisions can be made cooperatively or non-cooperatively. For example, in some 
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models, the wife decides about her labor supply after the husband has decided about his 
labor supply, whereas in other models, the partners bargain in a noncooperative fashion. 
These different arrangements have implications for labor supply decisions. Heath and Tan 
(2014) found that, generally, all else being equal, decision-making arrangements that 
empower women more are more likely to yield higher levels of labor supply. 
In addition, there are contextual aspects of the environment, largely out of the individual’s 
control, that can influence labor supply, such as changes in returns to work for a wage, 
changes in returns to work at home, labor and health technologies, and preferences 
influenced by culture and religion. The environment influencing the labor supply tends to 
change slowly over time. To assess how changes in labor supply relate to changes in the 
environment, the first approach would be to examine the behavior of women born in 
different decades (i.e., different cohorts have different environments). Figure 5 presents 
seven graphs for three cohorts: (1) women born in the 1950s (dotted line), women born in 
the 1960s (solid line), and women born in the 1970s (dashed line). Each line is a 
(smoothed) average of all countries in Latin America. The x-axis plots age, and the y-axis 
plots a different variable in each sub-figure. Given that the data are available only for 1990 
through 2010, different age ranges are observed for each cohort.  
Figure 5: Cohorts 
Latin America 
 
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys. 
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The graph on the top left-hand side shows that younger cohorts tend to participate more in 
the labor force, and their participation seems to peak at younger ages. Interestingly, the 
action seems to be on the extensive margin (participation, shown in the graph on the top 
left) rather than on the intensive margin (hours worked) or on employment rates because 
the graph in the top central panel indicates that there is not much difference in the numbers 
of hours worked per week by women of different cohorts at the same ages. The labor 
market incentives do not seem to differ either. Clearly, the probabilities of employment and 
wages increase with age, but at any given age, women in different cohorts experience the 
same incentives. These results justify further investigation of the extensive, as opposed to 
the intensive, margins.  
The three central sub-figures and the sub-figure on the lower left show that women in 
younger cohorts are more educated than those in older cohorts, tend to have fewer young 
children living with them, and tend to marry at older ages. In fact, the average number of 
years of education for females aged 20–60 years has increased over the past 25 years in 
Latin America, from about 6.4 years, on average, in 1986 to about 9.4 years, on average, in 
2012. Overall, the long-term changes in labor supply were accompanied by changes in 
education, marriage, and fertility. These changes were likely generated by changes in the 
environment. 
 
3. Determinants and mechanisms  
Section 3 describes the specific mechanisms through which various determinants, both 
endogenous (education and family formation) and exogenous (returns, technology, and 
preferences) influence labor supply. This is achieved by a review of the relevant literature 
and by providing, where possible, quantitative estimates of the effects of these determinants 
on female labor supply, to assess their relative effects. 
 
3.1. Education 
The first level of education, such as kindergarten or primary school, is the results of 
decisions made by parents. These decisions depend on their cultures, the availability of 
resources and infrastructure, policies in place regarding mandatory years of schooling, and 
conditional cash transfer programs, among other things. In many cultures, families invest 
less in their daughters’ than in their sons’ education. Glick (2008) argued that, holding 
other factors constant, daughters will receive less schooling than sons when: (1) parents 
expect to receive more money in the future from their sons than their daughters, (2) the 
marginal returns to schooling in the labor market are always higher for boys than for girls, 
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or (3) the marginal cost of schooling is always higher for girls. In addition, it is reasonable 
that providing more schooling to sons than daughters can arise from parents’ preferences of 
valuing their sons’ more than their daughters’ human capital or of placing relatively more 
value on the future wealth of their sons.  
Attaining an education beyond the mandatory level is believed to be mainly a result of 
women’s decisions influenced primarily by expected higher returns, although the decision 
is also constrained by factors such as culture, resources, family support or opposition, and 
expectations. In recent decades, women’s increased investments in education have been so 
dramatic that the education gender gap was reversed in Latin America as well as in many 
developed countries (Chioda, 2011). Because returns to education are positive, this increase 
in educational attainment induced an increase in expected wages, and therefore, in the 
opportunity cost of not working. In other words, it is expected that these increases in 
educational attainment will be accompanied by increases in female labor supply. However, 
causality can work in both directions: Women may be more likely to work because they are 
more highly educated; alternatively, they may advance their education because they aspire 
to work in better positions or for a higher pay. 
Indeed, many studies have found that higher expected returns in the labor market may drive 
schooling decisions. Foster and Rozensweig (1996) examined the green revolution in India, 
which generated an increase in the returns to primary school during a period of rapid 
technological progress, which, in turn, induced private investment in primary schooling. 
Similarly, using experimental evidence, Jensen (2012) assessed an intervention, also in 
India, that changed employment opportunities for women. He provided three years of 
recruiting services in randomly selected rural Indian villages to help young women obtain 
jobs. Young women in villages that received the service were significantly less likely to get 
married or have children, choosing instead to enter the labor market, attain higher 
education, or attend post-degree training.4 
There are many reasons, not directly related to labor force incentives, for women to be 
more educated than men. First, some scholars have proposed that women increase their 
education because they want to improve their marriage prospects (Greenwood et al., 2012). 
Second, in a labor market that discriminates against women, women get more education 
precisely to avoid that discrimination because the extent of discrimination is negatively 
related to educational attainment (Chiappori et al., 2009). Third, women may increase their 
                                                 
4 A growing expanse of literature argues that expected (perceived or subjective) returns influence schooling 
decisions. Kaufmann (2009) used a survey of perceived returns among high school graduates in Mexico to 
study the determinants of college attendance. She concluded that although expected returns and perceived 
risks from human capital investment were important determinants, lower returns or higher risks were 
insufficient to explain poor people’s low rates of attendance. Using the same data, Attanasio and Kaufman 
(2012) investigated the relationship between subjective expectations and schooling decisions. The authors 
found that individuals’ subjective expectations about their future incomes and employment influenced their 
decisions regarding higher education. 
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educational attainment because of recent changes in identity and a weakening of traditional 
values and norms. That is, women invest in education because of aspirations and changes to 
role expectations (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000).  
Have changes in educational attainment caused changes in the labor supply? Unfortunately, 
there is limited evidence with which to answer that question because labor supply and 
education are generally considered to be a joint decision, which makes it difficult to 
separate their effects on each other.  
 
3.2. Marriage 
Marriage can influence the labor supply by changing the relative returns of working inside 
versus working outside the home. Married women with children tend to participate less in 
the labor market than single women because the former have an alternative source of 
income (which raises their reservation wage) and a higher opportunity cost of working 
outside the home. In fact, married women’s labor supply elasticity is greater than that of 
married men (Blau and Kahn, 2005). In the US, McClelland and Mok (2012) found a 
substantial reduction in the labor supply elasticities of married women over the past three 
decades, although they were still higher than the elasticities of men or unmarried women. 
Who women marry also may influence differences in their labor supply in different regions 
of the income distribution. Studies have extensively analyzed the higher likelihood of 
marrying, or more generally, forming a family with someone similar with respect to 
characteristics such as educational attainment and income. This phenomenon is termed 
“assortative mating,” and these studies often focus on women’s labor patterns according to 
their husbands’ incomes.  
There are two extreme cases of mating: random mating, in which all the members of the 
population marry at random, and perfect sorting, in which all the members of the 
population marry someone from their income decile). In random mating, women’s wages 
relative to men’s are, on average, lowest for the wives of top-wage husbands. Therefore, 
these wives work the fewest hours, and the relationship of wives’ hours worked and 
husbands’ wages is negative. In the case of perfect sorting, with the presence of a gender 
wage gap that favors men, wives’ wages are increasing and concave5 relative to the 
husbands’ wages, as are wives’ hours worked. Between these two extremes, some marry at 
random and some marry someone from their decile, and in this case, we can expect the 
observed inverse-U relationship between wives’ hours worked and husbands’ wages decile 
that was seen in the 1990s. Bredemeier and Juessen (2013) performed a quantitative 
analysis of this model and found that the growth in women’s wages and the decline in 
fertility were the main drivers of the overall increase in wives’ hours worked since the 
                                                 
5 This scenario assumes a constant gender wage gap. 
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1970s. Specifically, they argued that the largest increase in wives’ hours worked was 
among those women who were married to high-wage men and, therefore, labor supply 
increases were a consequence of the positive trends observed in assortative mating since the 
1970s. 
Legal divorce also may provide an incentive for women to increase their labor force 
participation. When women are faced with the possibility of losing their source of income 
to divorce, they have an incentive to generate income on their own by participating in the 
labor market. Hence, the legalization of divorce has been observed as a natural experiment 
to find a causal link between the likelihood of divorce and female labor force participation. 
Bargain et al. (2012) employed the legalization of divorce in Ireland in 1996 as a natural 
experiment to analyze the effects of an exogenous increase in the perceived risk of marital 
dissolution on female labor supply. Using a control group of families with a low risk of 
dissolution, the authors estimated via a difference-in-difference model that the legalization 
of divorce significantly increased labor supply in the extensive margin, although it was not 
increased in the intensive margin. This finding is consistent with the notion that women 
want an external option when faced with the risk of divorce. Having a job, whether part-
time or full-time, gives women access to social networks and a potential remarriage market 
while helping them to maintain human capital levels. Bargain et al. (2012) found that a 1% 
increase in the risk of marital breakdown increased labor supply by about 0.20 hours per 
week and female labor force participation by 0.50–0.80 percentage points.   
 
3.3. Fertility 
Having children naturally influences mothers’ ability to work, at least during the period of 
childbirth and recovery, which can last from a couple of days to a few weeks. After 
recovery, babies and small children require a substantial amount of care, which influences 
parents’ labor supply. How do parents decide how much to work when they have children 
compared to people who do not have children? Lundberg (1988) found that there are strong 
interactions in the labor supply decisions of each parent when couples have preschool-aged 
children. That is, the hours that the parents work are jointly determined. However, when 
there are no young children, the hours worked by husband and wife are apparently 
independently decided.6  
Joint modeling of individuals’ decisions about fertility and employment requires 
complicated techniques. Francesconi (2002) used data on married women in the US to 
estimate fertility and labor supply decisions. The study found that women that interrupted 
their fulltime employment for 5 years experienced utility loss of about 1.5% per year over a 
                                                 
6 For a couple with children younger than age 6 years, an increase in the husband’s earnings tends to reduce 
the labor supply of the wife; if the husband’s monthly earnings increase by USD 100, the wife’s hours fall by 
6–9 hours per month. 
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20-year period, provided they reentered fulltime employment after the interruption. Shorter 
interruptions were associated with smaller losses. 
The literature has tried to quantify the impact of childbearing on female labor supply. 
Angrist and Evans (1998) used parents’ preferences for a mixed sibling-sex composition as 
a source of exogenous variation in fertility and found that the effect of the change from a 
two-child to a larger family reduced women’s labor supply by about 10.4%, on average, in 
the US in 1980. In 1990, the change to a larger family reduced it by 8.4%, and the labor 
market consequences of childbearing were likely to be more severe for poor and less 
educated women. However, having fewer children does not necessarily mean an increase in 
women’s labor force participation. Priebe (2010) employed the same instrument as Angrist 
and Evans (1998) in an Indonesian sample and found that having fewer children does not 
relate to an increase in labor supply because Indonesian women work primarily to cover 
child costs and fewer children means they need to work less. 
Cruces and Galiani (2007) also followed Angrist and Evans (1998) and used the preference 
of parents for a mixed sibling–sex composition in a study of two middle-income Latin 
American countries: Argentina and Mexico. They found a statistically significant negative 
effect of more than two children on the mother’s labor supply. In Argentina, the reduction 
was about 8.1–9.6 percentage points (for married women; in Mexico, the reduction was 
about 6.3–8.6 percentage points (for married women. Tortarolo (2014) tested the same 
instrument as Angrist and Evans (1998) using a large sample of census data spanning three 
decades from 14 Latin American countries and the US (1980s, 1990s, and 2000s). Using 39 
censuses, they applied ordinary least squares estimations and found a statistically 
significant negative relationship between fertility and mothers’ labor supply in each of the 
14 Latin American countries.7  
Another set of studies used fertility shocks, such as infertility and miscarriage, as 
exogenous sources of variation to find the causal effect of childbearing on women’s labor 
supply. Cristia (2008) found that when the first child was less than a year old, those 
mothers who had sought medical intervention to conceive had reduced employment by 26 
percentage points compared to mothers who had not sought medical intervention. Agüero 
and Marks (2011) used self-report infertility shocks among women in 26 developing 
countries as a source of exogenous variation in the number of children. They found that the 
effect of having children on labor force participation was not significant for mothers’ 
overall labor force participation, but it did decrease the likelihood of paid work, particularly 
among younger women and in relatively poorer countries. Among younger women, an 
additional child reduced paid employment by almost 2 percentage points, and in low-
                                                 
7 In Sweden, Angelov et al. (2013) compared women’s incomes and wage trajectories to those of their male 
partners’ before and after parenthood. Focusing on the within-couple gap, the study found that 15 years after 
entering parenthood, the gender gap in income had increased by 18 percentage points, and the gender gap in 
wages had increased by 10 percentage points, compared to the pre-child levels. Parenthood influenced men 
and women differently, causing persistent gaps in labor market returns within households. 
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income countries, an additional child reduced women’s paid employment by 2.1 percentage 
points.8  
The timing of childbearing also seems to affect labor supply. Having children in the later 
stages of a career may make it easier for women to return to their previous employment 
positions. Using the exogenous variation in birth timing induced by miscarriage and other 
negative fertility shocks before the first birth, Miller (2011) found positive effects of 
delayed motherhood on earnings and wages. Specifically, there was a substantial increase 
in earnings of 9% for each year of delay, an increase in wages of 3%, and an increase in 
work hours of 6%, with college-educated women and those in professional and managerial 
positions reaping the largest advantage. Postponing motherhood may reduce the career 
costs of children because later interruptions imply that the foregone investments are 
accrued over a shorter time horizon.  
Fitzenberger et al. (2013) calculated the amount of employment lost for bearing children 
now instead of later in Germany, a country that provides a lengthy maternity leave. They 
found that, in terms of cumulative employment losses measured in person-months, during 
the first five years after birth, an average of about two years (23 months or 38.5% of the 
total time) in employment is “lost” as a result of the birth of a child now instead of later. 
The employment loss is reduced over the first five years after childbirth, but it does not 
level off to zero at the end of that period. 
 
3.4. Technology 
Health Technologies. The introduction of the hormonal contraceptive (birth control) pill is 
a technological advancement that enabled women to control the quantity and timing of their 
children. Goldin and Katz (2002) argued that the direct effect of the pill was a decrease in 
the cost of remaining unmarried to women while they were investing in their professional 
careers. The pill reduced the cost of career investment for women by increasing age at first 
marriage. Bailey (2006) used the variation in US state laws allowing women under the age 
of 21 to obtain oral contraception without parental consent to estimate the impact of pill 
access on female labor force participation. She found that, from 1970–1990, early access to 
the pill can account for about three of the 20 percentage point increase (14%) in labor force 
participation rates and 15% of the increase in annual hours worked by women aged 16–30 
years. 
Albanesi and Olivetti (2009) studied the effects of technological progress in health and 
nutrition on reductions in the cost of childbearing. They found that, in the early 1900s, 
                                                 
8 They found no significant effects for middle-income countries, a finding that differs from that of Cruces and 
Galiani (2007), who showed that women in Mexico and Argentina with more than two children borne out of a 
preference for a balanced sex mix were less likely to participate in the labor force. This difference was mainly 
due to the differences among subpopulations. 
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women spent more than 60% of their prime childbearing years either pregnant or nursing. 
However, between 1920 and 1960, there were advancements in medical knowledge and 
obstetric practices that, together with the introduction of infant formula, reduced the time 
cost of raising children and led to an increase in the labor supply of young married women 
with children. Better maternal health decreased the adverse effects of pregnancy and 
childbirth on women’s abilities to work, and the introduction of infant formula reduced the 
comparative advantage of mothers in infant feeding.  
Abortion laws are another example of the availability of a health technology that allows 
women to decide if and when to bear children. Kalist (2004) examined whether the 
liberalization of US state abortion laws influenced female labor force participation with 
several probit participation equations. The results indicated that by reducing unwanted 
pregnancies and hence, fertility rates abortion increased the labor force participation rates 
of females, particularly the rates of single black women. Other studies have explored the 
effects of fertility on female labor supply using the legalization of abortion as an 
instrument. Angrist and Evans (1996) studied the effects of teenage and out-of-wedlock 
childbearing on the schooling and employment statuses of black women using measures of 
exposure to the 1970s’ abortion reform in US states as instruments. They found that black 
women who were exposed to abortion reforms experienced large reductions in teenage 
fertility and teenage out-of-wedlock fertility that apparently increased educational 
attainment and employment rates; there was no statistically significant effect for white 
women.  
Most studies on the effects of abortion focus on the US because several laws have legalized 
abortion since the 1970s, providing data both before and after the laws were enacted. The 
situation in Latin America is somewhat different. In this region, the only country that has 
fully legalized abortion is Uruguay, where women have been able to legally obtain an 
abortion on request since 2012.9 For most of the remaining Latin American countries, 
abortion is legal only when it is necessary to protect the health of the mother. Some 
countries, such as Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, prohibit abortion under 
any condition, and persons performing the procedure are penalized. 
Home Technologies. Traditionally, women are primarily responsible for household chores, 
which reduces their time available for working outside the home. In this context, 
technological progress in household production frees up women’s time and could drive an 
increase in the female labor supply. Studies have found that the female labor supply is 
influenced by technological progress in the home and the health and nutrition sectors. 
Thanks to technological progress, women are able to perform their traditional housekeeping 
and child care duties in less time. Moreover, these technologies reduce women’s 
comparative advantage for fulfilling these traditional roles. 
                                                 
9 Since the policy change is so recent there is, to the extent of our knowledge, no available study that 
estimates the impact of this change on demographics or economics outcomes.  
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Using household appliances reduces the time required to perform many household chores 
such as cooking, washing clothes, and cleaning. Greenwood et al. (2005) and Greenwood 
and Seshadri (2005) argued that the introduction of household appliances such as the 
refrigerator, vacuum cleaner, washing machine, dryer, microwave oven, and dishwasher, 
liberated women from home because they allowed women to save time in home production, 
which enabled them to enter the labor market. Greenwood et al. (2005) found an important 
decrease in the time that women spend performing housework tasks, from 58 hours per 
week in 1900 to 18 hours per week in 1975, which helped married women with children 
enter the work force. The authors found that in 1900, about 5% of married women worked 
in the labor force. By 1980, it had increased to about 50%, and more than half of that 
increase was due to the technological advancements in the household sector. Similarly, 
Coen-Pirani et al. (2010) tested the hypothesis that the diffusion of household appliances in 
the 1960s increased the labor force participation of married women. Using US census data, 
they found that owning three household appliances (specifically, a washer, dryer, and 
freezer) increased the likelihood of married women participating in the labor force by about 
27 percentage points between 1960 and 1970. Dinkelman (2011) found that five years after 
rural electrification in South Africa, female employment had increased by 9 percentage 
points (almost 30% from the baseline), freeing up women from activities associated with 
home production. 
Besides the advent of household appliances, their prices may determine whether they are 
actually purchased, thereby influencing the female labor supply. Cavalcanti and Tavares 
(2008) found that decreases in the prices of home appliances significantly increased female 
labor force participation. A 20% decrease in the relative price of appliances (i.e., the ratio 
of the price of the appliances to the consumer price index) increased labor force 
participation by 2%–3%, on average. In the case of the United Kingdom, between 1975 and 
1999, the decrease in the relative price of home appliances accounted for about a 10%–15% 
increase in female labor force participation. Similarly, Cubas (2010) studied the differences 
in female labor force participation in Latin America and the US between 1990 and 2005. 
The results showed that prices of household appliances and access to infrastructure were 
important for explaining cross-country labor supply differences. 
Work Technologies. Goldin (2014) proposed that convergence between men and women in 
the labor force requires job flexibility; that is, changes in the labor market determine how 
jobs are structured to enhance temporal flexibility. The gender gap in pay would be reduced 
if employers did not disproportionately reward employees who work long (or particular) 
hours. In fact, the diffusion of work technologies could influence female labor participation 
because these technologies allow for “telework” (working from home via the Internet) and 
flexible schedules. Dettling (2014) examined the ways that Internet use influenced the labor 
force participation of married women and found that high-speed Internet use increased their 
labor force participation by an average of 4.6 percentage points, with larger increases 
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among women with higher educational attainment and children. The primary connection 
between Internet use and labor market outcomes is telework; Internet use, through telework 
opportunities and flexible scheduling, has particularly benefited highly educated women’s 
participation in the labor force.  
 
3.5. Labor market returns: discrimination 
Female labor force participation is influenced by the prospects of earnings in the labor 
market. A key factor that affects the relative returns of males and females is discrimination. 
If a woman perceives that her wage will not be high enough to compensate her for what she 
expects to give up to perform that job, or if she perceives that she is being paid less than a 
man for equivalent work, she might decide to not participate in the labor market. In 
addition, because discrimination affects women’s wages relative to men’s, discrimination 
affects women’s decisions about specialization in home versus work production within the 
household. 
What are the sources of this type of discrimination? Childbearing hinders women’s labor 
force participation, at least, during the childbirth and recovery period. When an employer 
considers hiring a woman or a man with equivalent qualifications, the assumption that the 
woman has relatively greater potential for absences from the job can be detrimental to the 
woman’s job prospects. Similarly, if an employer must invest in workers’ training and 
believes that women are more likely than men to terminate employment, he may prefer to 
hire men (Neumark et al., 1996). Correll et al. (2007) found biases against mothers that 
influence the evaluations of their competence and commitment and whether they are hired, 
promoted, or receive a raise. These evaluative biases are mostly unjustified because, 
according to Correll et al. (2007), the majority of studies found no significant differences 
between mothers and non-mothers in the extent of their commitment, and the 
discrimination arises from perceptions. 
Two main approaches are used to quantitatively assess the existence and magnitude of 
wage discrimination: decomposition of wage gaps (combined with regression analysis) and 
field experiments.  
Decomposition of Wage Gaps. The most commonly used decomposition method is the 
Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition method, which statistically differentiates the portion of the 
wage gap corresponding to each observable factor (e.g., education, job experience, age, or 
race, and so on). The portion left unexplained by these observable factors is associated with 
discrimination. 
To study the gender wage gap around the world, Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer 
(2005) performed a quantitative systematic review (meta-analysis) of more than 260 
published papers covering 63 countries from the 1960s through the 1990s. They found that, 
during the study period, the raw wage differentials decreased significantly, from about 65% 
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to about 30%, with most of the decline attributed to women’s labor market endowments 
(higher educational attainment, training, and work attachment). The authors specified a 
standardized gender wage gap with the standardizing data selection and econometric 
method, and they found that the ratio of what women would earn, if there were no 
discrimination relative to their actual wages, decreased by approximately 0.17% annually, 
indicating that moderate gender equalization between wages was occurring. 
Additionally, Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005) stressed the importance of 
statistically controlling for certain observable characteristics to reduce the bias in the 
calculation of the discrimination component of the gap. Missing or imprecise data on 
human capital factors, such as work experience, on-the-job training, or job tenure with the 
actual employer can result in important biases in the calculation of the unexplained 
component. For example, the researchers found that studies that did not account for work 
experience had greatly overestimated the unexplained portion of the gender wage gap.  
For 18 countries in Latin America,10 Hoyos and Ñopo (2010) calculated the gender 
earnings gaps between 1992 and 2007, using a different decomposition method. During that 
15-year span, the overall wage gap declined from 16.32%–8.85% of average female wages, 
which represented a significant decrease of about 7 percentage points. The unexplained 
component decreased about 3–4% (a statistically significant result), depending on the 
characteristics for which the authors conducted the statistical adjustment. They found 
important heterogeneities across countries; for instance, Brazil showed the widest gap but 
was also closing the gap the fastest.11  
Field Experiments. There are substantial differences favoring men over women in pay and 
promotion. Even after controlling for demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, 
women earn significantly less and are less likely to be promoted to top-ranking positions. 
One potentially important reason for these differences is that men and women may respond 
differently to competitive environments. Antonovics et al. (2004) used data from a 
competitive television game show to mimic some competitive aspects between men and 
women in the labor force and assessed whether men and women of similar skill levels 
perform equally well in competitive environments. They found that in situations of direct 
competition, men outperformed their female opponents more than 72% of the time, and 
                                                 
10 The countries they examined were Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, El Salvador, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
11 Much of the relevant literature associates the unexplained portion of the wage gap with discrimination. 
However, some authors have pointed out that “residual discrimination” would only measure the extent to 
which the gap is caused by unobservable factors besides discrimination. Therefore, these measures of 
discrimination using these types of decompositions are biased because of the lack of relevant controls. The 
estimations of the gender gaps do not include many control variables that measure characteristics such as 
abilities, educational attainment, and family environments, or factors such as preferences for non-market 
activities, which could be a determinant unobservable factor of the female labor supply in Chile (Bravo et al., 
2008). 
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ability explained no more than about 27% of this differential. Even after controlling for 
ability, the men outperformed the women in competitive settings. 
Experiments have also been used to test for the presence of gender discrimination in hiring. 
The most popular experiments are the audit experiments, where resumés presenting 
equivalent qualifications but changed genders and names are used to apply for jobs. When 
the names alone are changed, the results provide an unbiased estimate of discrimination at 
the hiring stage (Booth and Leigh, 2010). In Latin America, Bravo et al. (2008) 
implemented an experiment to determine the presence of gender discrimination in hiring. 
The experiment used fictitious resumés to apply for real jobs. The resumés presented 
equivalent qualifications and job experience, but they differed in terms of the fictitious 
applicant’s gender. The researchers found that men and women apparently have the same 
probability of being called for a job interview because the callback rates in response to the 
resumés were 14.9% for the male names and 14.6% for the female names, and the 
difference was not statistically significant. This lack of a significant difference in the 
callback rates differs from the findings of previous studies, perhaps because these findings 
are limited to the first step in the hiring process, the callback. Discrimination in hiring may 
occur at the second or third callback or when the final hiring decision is made. 
  
3.6. Labor market returns: macroeconomic crises 
The two likely changes in the labor market during a macroeconomic crisis are an outward 
shift of the aggregate labor supply curve and an inward shift of the aggregate labor demand 
curve, which would result in a decline in real wages. However, the net effect on 
employment is theoretically ambiguous because it would depend on the relative size of the 
shifts and the elasticities of both curves. 
Economic crises affect employment and labor market returns for both genders. Stotsky 
(2006) found evidence suggesting that women’s employment is more resilient than men’s 
during a recession in many countries. There could be many factors underlying this 
phenomenon. For example, male-dominated occupations, such as the construction industry, 
are more cyclical and more responsive to recessions. Furthermore, women are relatively 
more likely to work in fast-growing industries, such as the service sector, that may be 
relatively more resistant to recessions. Additionally, Stotsky (2006) pointed out that these 
differences might reflect differences in participation rates by gender, particularly if women 
are more likely than men to leave and re-enter the labor force as working conditions 
change. 
What exactly is the influence of a crisis on labor force participation? Using a panel of 86 
countries and data for the period 1980–2005, Signorelli, Choudhry, and Marelli (2012) 
found that financial crises are related to small but statistically significant reductions (0.829 
percentage points) in female labor force participation. Analysis on a sample of 10 upper-
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middle-income economies12 that included 6 Latin American countries showed that financial 
crises led to a reduction of 2.5 percentage points in female labor force participation. In a 
sample of 20 lower-middle-income economies13 that included 9 Latin American countries, 
they found no statistically significant effects of financial crises on female labor force 
participation.  
An economic crisis causes a resulting reduction in household income. In response, 
households want to increase their labor force participation and hours worked despite the 
labor demand constraints induced by the crisis. For example, the 2002 Argentine financial 
crises primarily caused a considerable fall in real wages, which was accompanied by little 
increase in labor supply due to weak labor demands (McKenzie, 2003a). There was no 
statistically significant effect on female labor participation. Regarding the 1995 Mexican 
peso crisis, McKenzie (2003b) found that households used reductions in fertility and 
primary health care investments as financial coping mechanisms instead of adding workers 
to the labor force or increasing existing workers’ hours because during this aggregate 
shock, there were labor demand constraints. 
During a recession, if the husband is the primary earner and loses his job, the wife can enter 
the labor force and then later exit it when the primary earner is reemployed. This is referred 
to as the “added worker effect,” and it can be interpreted as a household strategy against 
unemployment shocks during economic crises. Cerruti (2000) found evidence of the added 
worker effect in Argentina, where the increase in female labor force participation is not due 
to improvements in the conditions of the labor supply or the broadening of opportunities 
available to women. Instead, it is mostly a response to increasing instability and 
unemployment among male primary earners associated with the implementation of 
structural adjustment policies since 1991. Cerruti’s (2000) main contention is that women 
decide to participate in the labor market to reduce the economic uncertainty of the 
household. 
The global economic crisis of 2008 was similarly associated with an increase in female 
labor force participation and a decrease in male labor force participation. This crisis 
induced a negative income shock to households, and labor supply had to be adjusted 
accordingly, with the possibility of the emergence of the added worker effect. 
Khitarishvili’s (2013) study of a sample of 28 Central and Eastern European and former 
Soviet Union countries provides evidence of the added-worker effect in 2010 because 
married women whose husbands lost their jobs increased their labor force participation by 
10.5 percentage points.  
                                                 
12 The countries were Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa, Turkey, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
13 The countries were Algeria, Bolivia, Cameroon, China, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, the 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. 
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3.7. Policies: labor market regulations and taxes 
When discussing the effects of labor market regulations, it is important to remember that 
most studies about labor laws are set in developed countries, which likely have higher 
enforcement powers than developing countries.  
Minimum Wage. Governments mandate minimum wages, targeted at low-wage earners, to 
assure these workers a basic standard of living. A higher minimum wage potentially creates 
incentives for women to participate in the labor market because it could make working for a 
wage relatively more attractive than home production (Boeri et al., 2008). Since women 
tend to populate low-earning occupations, the regulations that affect minimum wages are 
particularly important to women. Moreover, minimum wage laws improve women’s wages 
relative to those of men’s because there are more women at the bottom of the wage 
distribution (Jaumotte, 2003). 
The literature about minimum wage has focused on its effects on employment; scant 
attention has been paid to its impact on labor force participation (Boeri et al., 2008). 
Another limitation in the literature is that studies rarely consider employers’ possible 
substitution of non-cash for cash compensation as a way of avoiding the minimum wage 
requirements (Boeri et al., 2008). Regarding the effects of minimum wage on employment, 
Neumark and Wascher (2007) reviewed more than 100 empirical studies. Focusing on the 
most methodologically robust studies (85% of the total), they found a small negative effect 
of minimum wage on employment level. These results suggest that minimum wage 
apparently has been set at a level modest enough to not have an important influence on 
female employment (Jaumotte, 2003). 
Parental Leave. Maternity leave is a benefit provided by all the Latin American countries 
in our sample. In the majority of the countries, maternity leave benefits paid to the worker 
are financed mostly by governmental social security. In our sample, the countries that 
provided the longest maternity leave were Venezuela and Chile (18 weeks), while 
Honduras provided the shortest leave (10 weeks). In addition, paternity leave is provided by 
8 of the 15 countries in our sample. Venezuela provides the longest paternity leave (14 
days). Even when parental leave is funded by general tax revenue, the asymmetry between 
the lengths of paid maternity and paternity leaves generates a differential cost to employers 
when hiring men and women. This difference arises because with respect to the birth of a 
child, women are absent from their jobs longer than men, which means that the cost of 
hiring women is higher than the cost of hiring men. 
A review of empirical studies about the effects of maternity leave in Europe, the US, and 
Canada found that, over time, there has been an increase in women’s labor force 
participation before childbirth, an increase in the probability that a woman returns to the 
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same employer after maternity leave, and some negative effects on wages (Boeri et al., 
2008).  
Blau and Kahn (2013) found that so-called family-friendly policies in OECD countries 
(e.g., parental leave, part-time work entitlements, and child care policies) increase female 
labor force participation and reduce the gender gap in labor force participation. The 
expansion of these policies explained about 28% of the decrease in US women’s labor force 
participation relative to the corresponding values in other OECD countries (Blau and Kahn, 
2013). However, the types of jobs at which American women work differ from women’s 
jobs in other OECD countries. Those polices seem to incentivize women to work part time 
and at lower level jobs compared to women in the US (Blau and Kahn, 2013). 
Taxes. Scholars generally agree that payroll taxes reduce formal employment in developing 
countries. In theory, the extent to which employment is influenced depends on how much 
of the amount (or proportion) of payroll tax can be passed on to the workers in the form of 
lower wages (Kugler and Kugler, 2009). The bulk of the empirical evidence concerns the 
effects of taxes on employment and wages; studies about the effects on labor force 
participation are rare and mostly set in developed countries.  
Heckman and Pagés (2003) found that payroll taxation in Latin America tended to reduce 
employment and increase unemployment rates. In Colombia, for instance, a 10% increase 
in payroll taxes in 1993 reduced formal employment by between 4% and 5% (Kugler and 
Kugler, 2009). 
Some countries, such as the US, offer a lower effective income tax rate to married couples 
(compared to single individuals), which is linked to the joint taxation of the couple. 
However, most countries tax individuals’ incomes. Guner et al. (2012) found through 
simulation exercises with US data that a reform that changes taxation from joint filing by 
married couples (the current system) to separate filing (individual taxation) influences the 
labor supply. A transition from the current system to separate filing would increase the 
labor force participation of married women by about 10.4%, and it would increase by 
18.1% for married women with children. In the intensive margin, the aggregate hours 
worked by married women would increase by about 11.4%. The authors proposed that such 
a big change would occur because separate filing would greatly reduce the tax burden 
associated with female labor force participation (Guner et al., 2012).  
Using US-based data, Eissa (2002) found that, after the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which 
reduced the marginal tax rate paid by high-income married women by about 40%, the labor 
supply of this category of women increased by about 90 hours per year. The hours worked 
elasticity of high-income women with respect to the after-tax wage was estimated to range 
from 0.6–0.8, with almost half the total elasticity attributed to labor force participation 
(Eissa, 2002).  
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Similarly, van Soest and Stancanelli (2010) found that a transition from joint to separate 
taxation for married couples would increase women’s labor force participation by 0.20 
percentage points and their hours worked by 3.21%.  
 
3.8. Policies: Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) Programs 
Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) are intended to help children build human capital 
through educational enrollment, consistent school attendance, and periodic health checkups. 
CCT programs target the poorest households, which are geographically located mostly in 
rural areas. The household member who receives the cash transfer tends to be the mother of 
the target child because policymakers generally believe that mothers are more likely than 
fathers to promote children’s wellbeing based on their different preferences and priorities.  
Mexico’s Progresa (now Oportunidades) Program is one of the first CCT programs in the 
world. It was launched in the 1990s, and there is evidence of its success at reducing poverty 
and increasing children’s schooling. Since then, many other Latin American countries, such 
as Brazil, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Peru, and others, 
have implemented CCTs as part of their poverty reduction strategies. 
Economic theory does not predict an unequivocal effect of CCTs on labor force 
participation. On the one hand, there might be a negative effect on labor force participation, 
which can be explained by three reasons. First, when people receive unearned income, they 
have less incentive to work (due to disincentives to work through an income effect). 
Second, compliance with the conditionalities that require school attendance and periodic 
health examinations may be time-consuming, which may reduce the amount of time 
available for work or leisure, particularly for women. For example, Parker and Skoufias 
(2000) found that many women in the Progresa Program reported spending their time 
transporting children to schools and clinics. Third, there may be a price effect; the CCTs’ 
beneficiaries may believe (correctly or incorrectly) that to remain eligible for a means-
tested CCT program they need to work less to remain poor (Fiszbein et al., 2009). On the 
other hand, CCTs can have a positive impact on labor force participation. First, because the 
CCTs’ conditionalities require children to attend school, time that their mothers had 
previously allocated to child care becomes available for work outside the home. Second, 
when children attend school, they cannot work as much, which decreases household income 
and increases the demand for income (generated by work) from adult household members. 
However, the strength of this relationship depends on the amount of the children’s unearned 
income relative to total household income.  
This review focuses on the adult female labor supply, but it is important to describe the 
ways in which CCTs influence child labor because they have implications for human 
capital accumulation, and thus, future labor market outcomes. The condition of the CCT 
mandating school attendance reduces households’ costs of schooling, which tends to 
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increase the likelihood of schooling and the reduction of child labor (Parker and Skoufias, 
2000). Moreover, mandating schooling as a condition may encourage parents to assign 
more value to education, and hence, decrease their children’s labor. The fact that the CCT 
increases households’ incomes necessarily lessens households’ dependence on children’s 
income from work and decreases the children’s labor (Fiszbein et al., 2009). 
Empirically, most studies have found a reduction of child labor caused by CCT payments. 
Edmonds and Schady (2012) found that, in Ecuador’s Bono de Desarrollo Humano 
Program, a cash transfer less than 20% of the median child labor earnings significantly 
reduced child labor activities. The children in households that were induced to participate in 
the Program experienced reduced paid employment by about 78% and unpaid economic 
activities inside their home by about 32%.  
Parker and Skoufias (2000) found that Mexico’s Progresa Program reduced child labor 
among older children, particularly boys. Overall work participation, including household 
work (chores), farm activities, and market activities, among boys aged 12–17 years 
significantly decreased by 4 percentage points from a pre-Program level of 55%. This 
reduction in work participation correlates with the increase in school participation, 
providing positive evidence of the substitution of school for work in this setting. The 
Progresa Program reduced 8–17-year-old girls’ labor force participation by 1.3 percentage 
points from a pre-treatment level of 8.6% and reduced boys’ labor force participation by 3.1 
percentage points from a pre-treatment level of 22.4%. The largest reduction in girls’ labor 
activities was in the extent of their domestic work, which was about a 10% reduction in 
participation, although there was no a significant reduction in the number of hours spent 
doing domestic work. Similarly, an evaluation of the Progresa Program conducted by 
Sadoulet et al. (2004)14 found that, for children aged 12–14 years, participation in Progresa 
reduced the probability that boys worked by 7 percentage points on average, which 
represents a 23% decrease. For girls, the reduction was 6 percentage points, on average, 
which represented a 50% decrease. 
Skoufias and Parker (2001) presented interesting findings about girls’ schooling: The 
increase in school attendance due to participation in the Progresa program was much larger 
for girls than boys, which is similar to the findings of other studies (e.g., Sadoulet et al., 
2004). For 8–17-year-olds, the average effect of participation in the Progresa Program on 
school attendance for girls was almost twice that of boys (a 4 percentage point increase for 
girls versus a 2.2 percentage point increase for boys). For the girls aged 12–17, the 
Progresa Program increased school attendance by 7 percentage points (about a 14% 
increase), up from the pre-program level of 51%. 
                                                 
14 Sadoulet et al. (2004) pointed out that their coefficients are consistent with the findings of Skoufias and 
Parker (2001), although they are slightly larger. The reasons for the difference are that Sadoulet et al.’s (2004) 
analysis controlled for child fixed-effects, estimated Progresa’s impact in each round instead of for each year, 
and estimated the impact on the round in 2000 after the control group was incorporated. 
24 
 
 
3.9. Policies: subsidies to child care 
Many countries around the world, including those in Latin America, have increased the 
provision of subsidized child care. The evidence regarding the effects of these programs on 
labor supply is usually positive but heterogeneous. Child care facilities can be provided 
through child care subsidies, as in Sweden (Lundin, Mörk, and Öckert, 2008) and Norway 
(Havnes and Mogstad, 2011); by building new child care centers, such as in Argentina 
(Berlinski and Galiani, 2007) and Chile (Medrano, 2009); or by providing after-school care, 
as in Switzerland (Felfe, Lecher, and Thielman, 2013).  
Subsidized child care services have positive effects on labor supply, but these results are 
difficult to generalize. Akgunduz and Plantenga (2011) argued that the elasticity of child 
care prices has an inverted U-shape that depends on the initial characteristics of each 
country. They theorized that a reduction in child care costs might not have significant 
effects in countries with low female labor force participation or in countries already having 
high female labor force participation rates. Countries having high rates of female labor 
force participation before implementation of a child care program do not have much room 
for improvement. Lundin et al. (2008) found that, in Sweden, a considerable reduction in 
public child care prices did not translate into an increase in female paid labor, mainly 
because Sweden has been a frontrunner in providing public child care since the 1960s and 
has consistently had high levels of mothers’ labor supply. However, countries with low 
labor force participation may have some characteristics that prevent significant changes 
related to these policies. These countries tend to have traditional norms and/or rigid 
institutions that would prevent a large effect of the program. Del Boca and Vuri (2006) 
emphasized that, in Italy, the presence of a high-quality child care system did not translate 
into a higher probability of employment. They argued that Italy’s rigid labor market, with 
most of its employment being full-time, is incompatible with a child care system that offers 
partial coverage during the day.  
Child care programs should have a greater effect in countries with relatively low labor force 
participation and with labor markets that are somewhat flexible. Subsidies for child care 
can free up mothers to enter the labor market. The provision of less expensive child care 
has been found to positively influence female labor force participation in Canada 
(Lefebvre, Merrigan, and Verstraete 2009), France (Goux and Maurin, 2010), Argentina 
(Berlinski and Galiani, 2007; Berlinski, Galiani, and McEwan, 2011), and Germany 
(Bauernschuster and Schilotter, 2013). Child care policies also are associated with long-
term effects in countries such as Canada (Lefebvre et al., 2009) and Spain (Nollemberg and 
Rodrigues-Planas, 2011). The reduction of time spent outside the labor force leads to better 
opportunities to find a job and better long-term prospects for the mother.  
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Scholars believe that the main driver of these positive results is the behavior of some 
subgroups of women, particularly women with children, who, in the absence of the 
program, would face a much higher cost of child care. Cascio (2006) found a positive effect 
of public schooling on maternal labor supply among single mothers with young children 
but not on married mothers. In general, studies on countries such as Canada (Lefebvre et 
al., 2009) and France (Goux and Maurin, 2010) have found that the particular targets of 
child care subsidies are the vulnerable population groups of single mothers and relatively 
less-educated mothers. 
  
3.10. Preferences: culture and religion 
A society’s prevailing values and its ideas about women’s roles are influenced by culture 
(and sometimes, by religion). These factors can shape women’s preferences and aspirations, 
thereby influencing their decisions regarding labor force participation. 
Culture. Culture can be defined as a set of preferences and beliefs. Economists have 
worked to rationalize the ways that culture and gender roles influence women’s labor force 
participation. The economics of identity aim to study culture and preferences in an 
economic theory framework, specifically the ways that identity, or a person’s sense of self, 
influences economic outcomes. For example, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) argued that 
women tend to dominate jobs that match female gender characteristics, and they avoid male 
professions because of male gender associations. Similarly, men tend to avoid so-called 
women’s professions. These scholars proposed that the US women’s movement of the 
1960s and 1970s included goals to deconstruct societal notions of femininity and disengage 
gender from tasks, both in the home and the workplace. The social changes resulting from 
that movement lessened women’s gains in identity from homemaking and lessened their 
identity loss from working at a so-called man’s job, both of which increased female labor 
force participation and decreased occupational gender segregation. In this identity theory of 
gender in the workplace, decreased occupational gender segregation between 1970 and 
1990 in the US can be interpreted as primarily having been caused by the widespread 
changes in social norms related to gender. 
Social attitudes toward working women influence married women’s labor force 
participation. Fernandez (2013) studied the function of cultural changes generating the 
sharp increase in married women’s labor force participation in the US during the twentieth 
century. She modeled the changes in culture as emerging from a learning process, in which 
married women compared the benefits of increased consumption from labor earnings with 
the anticipated utility cost of working. Her model generated a time-based trend of married 
women’s labor force participation that correlates with the historical path observed in the US 
over the past 120 years. 
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Studying the descendants of immigrants helps isolate the effects of other factors while 
examining culture’s particular role in decisions about participation in the labor market. For 
example, second-generation Americans share economic and institutional characteristics 
with their fellow Americans; however, they do not necessarily share the mainstream culture 
because they likely are influenced by their parents’ cultural preferences and beliefs from 
the country of origin. Fernández and Fogli (2009) exploited this idea by exploring culture’s 
role in determining the work outcomes of second-generation American women. The authors 
employed the 1970 US census and used the female labor force participation rates for 1950 
and the total fertility rates of the parents’ countries as proxy measures of cultural 
preferences and beliefs about women’s roles. The results indicated that women whose 
parents were born in countries where women participated relatively more in the workforce 
tended to work relatively more. A one standard deviation increase in labor force 
participation in 1950 was associated with about a 7.5% increase in the women’s numbers of 
hours worked per week in 1970. 
A married woman’s decision to work may be influenced by her husband’s preferences and 
belies about gender roles. Fernández et al. (2004) found that the probability that a man’s 
wife was in the labor force was correlated with whether his mother had worked, controlling 
for background characteristics. They further found that the probability that a married 
woman was in the labor force full-time was about 24–32 percentage points higher when her 
husband’s mother had worked for at least one year when he was a child. In addition, they 
found an intergenerational channel such that a one-week increase in the average female 
labor supply led to an increase of 1.67 weeks worked by females in the next generation. 
Similarly, Del Boca et al. (2000) found that when the husband became unemployed, the 
wife’s employment response was mediated by her attitudes toward work, which were 
proxied by whether the wife’s mother had worked or her mother-in-law had worked at her 
age. From this perspective, cultural norms present an obstacle to overcoming poverty. If the 
cultural beliefs that women should not work outside the home are strong and the household 
is poor, their effects are likely to make it difficult for the household to overcome poverty. 
Notwithstanding the type of economic shock that may hit a poor household, the wife would 
remain unlikely to enter the labor force. 
Religion. Religion carries its own set of preferences and beliefs that potentially influence 
women’s decisions about participation in the labor force. Religion is of particular interest in 
Latin America because it is a traditionally Catholic region where the church has an 
important and strong influence on daily life. Considering the 15 countries in our sample, on 
average, about 72% of the population of each country is reportedly Catholic. Guiso et al. 
(2003) analyzed data from 66 countries and found that religious people tended to have less 
favorable attitudes toward working women. In Latin America, there is a slightly negative 
relationship between labor force participation and the size of the practicing Catholic 
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proportion of the population. Indeed, the highest rate of female labor force participation 
exists in the country with the lowest proportion of practicing Catholics. 
Studies have found that Protestants tend to work more hours, on average, than people of 
other religions. Pastore and Tenaglia (2013) used data from European countries and found 
that active Catholic women tended to work fewer hours than average, and non-active 
Protestant women tend to work more hours than average. They further found a strong 
negative association between the proportion of individuals belonging to the Catholic 
Church and the proportion of women participating in the labor force.  
Feldmann (2007) examined data from 80 countries to investigate whether the Protestant 
religion influenced labor market outcomes and found that the countries in which the 
majority of the population practiced Protestantism had significantly higher labor force 
participation rates, particularly among women. Compared to countries dominated by other 
religions, labor participation rates in Protestant-dominated countries were between 11 and 
12.8 percentage points higher, adjusting for other factors that influence labor market 
outcomes, such as labor laws, GDP growth, and so on. The Protestant virtue of hard and 
diligent work seems to have become part of the national culture where Protestantism 
dominates (Feldman, 2007). 
Ultimately, the decision to participate in the labor market is influenced by both culture and 
religion, among other factors in the social environment. It is challenging to disentangle the 
effects of one from the others because they are deeply interrelated in people’s lives. The 
dominant religion of a country, particularly religions with historical traditions, shapes the 
national culture and influences even the people who practice minority religions. Religious 
values are transmitted from generation to generation, although not always as much from 
deep convictions as from force of habit (Guiso et al., 2003). 
 
4. An assessment of the relative importance of the determinants 
To assess the relative merits of the various explanations for female labor force 
participation, two independent strategies were undertaken. First, portions of the literature 
were summarized and analyzed with measures of changes in some determinants of the labor 
supply. Second, household data were analyzed with policy variables to reveal correlates 
between the determinants of these explanatory variables. 
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4.1. Effect Sizes in the Literature 
A literature search was conducted between September 2014 and March 2015. To avoid 
publication bias, published and unpublished papers were searched in several databases15 
using a predefined set of keywords.16 The criteria that determined study inclusion were as 
follows: (1) Papers that provided estimations of causal effects of a given determinant on the 
extensive or intensive margins of labor supply were included, and (2) the chosen studies 
were required to provide sufficient information to compute effect sizes. Studies were 
excluded when (1) they were unrelated to labor force participation and instead examined 
employment or unemployment status outcomes, (2) they were theoretical papers, (3) the 
estimation methods employed therein did not distinguish among the effects of the 
covariates on the outcome, (4) they were book reviews, policy recommendation reports, or 
strictly descriptive analyses, and (5) they were nonquantitative research reports. These 
restrictions meant that some topics were excluded from the analysis (such as education, 
discrimination, and preferences), and some of the papers discussed in the previous section 
were excluded.17 
 
Figure 6: Labor supply and joint decisions variables Latin America 
 
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys. All index series are 
normalized in terms of the first year (1992) 
 
                                                 
15 These included Econlit, JStor, Repec, SSRN, NBER, AEA, Google Scholar, the Inter-American 
Development Bank working papers series, and the World Bank databases. 
16 The keywords included “female” (“labor supply,” “labor force participation,” or “hours worked”) and a set 
of words (listed in Figure 1) related to the determinants of labor supply. 
17 These include, for example, Aguero and Marks (2011), Berlinski and Galiani (2007), Cristia (2008), Cruces 
and Galiani (2007), Del Boca (2015), Dinkelman (2011), Galiani and McEwan (2013), Grogan and Sadanand 
(2012), Klonner and Nolen (2010), and Lehman (2014). 
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Figure 6 shows the evolution between 1992 and 2012 of the average female labor force 
participation in Latin America, educational attainment (years of education), marriage rates 
(the proportion of women living with a spouse or partner in the total population), and 
fertility (total number of children). All the series are normalized to one in 1992. Education 
increased in tandem with labor force participation, marriage generally remained constant, 
and fertility declined. Tables 6.2a and 6.2b in the Appendix provides a set of disaggregated 
statistics on these possible determinants of labor force participation. 
The analysis did not estimate causal effects of educational attainment on labor supply. 
However, it should be noted that, in Latin America, countries have continually and 
substantially expanded access to basic education since the beginning of the twentieth 
century. A large part of that expansion has been driven by policies related to education per 
se and not the female labor supply (Bassi, Busso, and Muñoz, 2015). Accordingly, it is 
likely that improved access to education is one of the drivers of higher rates of female labor 
force participation. 
Figure 7: Effect sizes of marriage on female labor supply 
  
* Semi-elasticity, ** Because of scale the lower IC of paper number 98 is not shown. Source: own calculations 
based literature analysis. 
Figure 7 presents the effect sizes of the marriage-related variables on labor supply. Each 
data point (the diamond shapes within the figure) shows an effect size; that is, it illustrates 
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the percentage change in labor supply divided by the percentage change in the dependent 
variable. Figure 7 shows a 95% confidence interval for each effect size. The legend on the 
right-hand side of the graph in Figure 7 provides information about the country in which 
the study was conducted, the identity of the independent or dependent variable that 
underwent a change, and a number within parentheses associated with Table 3 in the 
Appendix, indicating details of additional studies as references.  
Spousal wages and healthcare coverage were negatively related to labor outcomes, and 
increase in the risk of divorce was associated with an increase in female labor force 
participation. Those results are consistent with the analyses of the mechanisms described in 
Section 3, where we noted that the research literature tends to find small or weak effects of 
changes in marriage rates on female labor supply and positive associations of divorce on 
female labor force participation. These facts, together with the observation that marriage 
rates have changed little in the region, suggest that marriage-related variables cannot 
completely explain the long-term observed trends in female labor supply in Latin America. 
 
Figure 8: Labor supply and technology variables Latin America 
 
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys. All index series are 
normalized in terms of the first year (1992) 
 
Figure 8 presents the evolution of female labor force participation with three selected 
technology variables: prevalence of contraception (health technology), use of appliances in 
the home (home technology), and availability of electricity (home technologies). Access to 
health and home technologies has increased in Latin America. The reasons previous studies 
found a negative effect of childbearing and a positive effect of delaying childbearing on the 
female labor supply were discussed in the literature review (see Section 3.4). It was 
concluded that the studies found significant effects of health technologies on the labor 
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supply. In particular, access to and use of contraceptive methods (i.e., the pill) has likely 
had a positive effect; access to technologies that save time during a child’s infancy (i.e., 
formula) has also likely had a positive effect on the labor supply. Access to abortion, 
however, is an unlikely explanation in the Latin American context because it is illegal in 
most Latin American countries. 
Figure 9 presents the effect sizes of changes in fertility and health technology variables on 
the female labor supply. The figure illustrates that, generally, there apparently is a negative 
relationship between the total fertility rate and the female labor supply with, sometimes, 
very large effect sizes. Additionally, access to health technology apparently has a positive 
effect on labor outcomes. These findings, together with the observations that fertility rates 
have declined and access to health technology has increased in Latin America, suggest that 
these two causal variables might explain an important part of the increase in labor supply. 
 
Figure 9: Effect sizes of fertility and health technologies 
* Semi-elasticity. Source: own calculations based literature analysis. 
 
 
Figure 10: Effect sizes of home and work technology 
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* Semi-elasticity, ** Because of scale the upper IC of paper number 127 is not shown. Source: own 
calculations based literature analysis. 
Figure 10 presents the effect sizes of changes in home and work technology variables on 
the female labor supply. Generally, the effects are small and vary in direction. As pointed 
out by Goldin (2014), work technologies that allow for flexible working hours have not yet 
changed significantly in developed countries, and it is very likely that they have not 
changed in Latin America. Thus, we give little credibility to that explanation. However, the 
use of home technologies has dramatically changed. Even so, the effect sizes appear to be 
on the lower side of the distribution. Therefore, these factors probably do not explain much 
of the increase in the female labor supply since 1990. Some studies have found positive 
changes in women’s labor activities after increased access to specific time-saving home 
appliances (washer, dryer, and freezer). Access to public services, such as electricity and 
in-home high-speed Internet, has been associated with increases in women’s labor force 
participation. Similarly, Black, Kolesnikova, and Taylor (2007) found a negative 
relationship between commuting time in US metropolitan areas and women’s labor force 
participation. Despite the small effect sizes, it is reasonable that access to home 
technologies might explain some portion of the increases in female labor force participation 
before the 1990s, when most of the innovations and expansions in electricity occurred in 
Latin America. It might also explain why the labor supply gap between poorer and richer 
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households shrunk since the former are usually the last to incorporate technological 
advancements in their households. 
Figure 11: Effect size of changes in labor returns (macroeconomic conditions) 
* Semi-
elasticity, ** Because of scale the upper IC of paper number 82 is not shown. Source: own calculations based 
literature analysis. 
Figure 11 shows the effect sizes of changes in macroeconomic conditions on the labor 
supply. The effects are generally small, and as the literature review revealed, 
macroeconomic conditions vary in the short term and are more likely explanations of 
cyclical changes than of long-term trends in the female labor supply. However, 
macroeconomic variables are positively related with female labor force outcomes. Olivety 
(2013) found a positive relationship between GPD and labor force participation. Being in a 
financial crisis was associated with a decrease in women’s labor force participation, and in 
developed countries, recovery from macroeconomic shocks was associated with an increase 
of female work hours. 
Figure 12 describes the evolution of the female labor supply compared to the ratio of 
female to male wages (a crude measure of labor market discrimination). During the past 20 
years, this type of discrimination has decreased, although the decline has stagnated 
recently. There are no studies estimating the extent to which a decrease in the wage gap 
influences the female labor supply. As the literature review suggested, the effects of 
discrimination on the female labor supply operate via a number of channels. The most 
obvious one is that discrimination changes the comparative advantage of men and women 
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to work outside the home. Therefore, it is expected that changes in discrimination would 
increase female labor force participation. 
Figure 12: Labor supply and labor returns (discrimination) Latin America 
 
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys. All index series are 
normalized in terms of the first year (1992) 
 
Figure 13 describes the evolution of the female labor supply in contrast to a set of policy 
variables. Preschool enrollment has dramatically increased in the region. In addition, the 
number of CCT beneficiaries has tripled since the early 2000s, and tax compliance has 
increased in the past decade. 
Figure 13: Labor supply and policy variables. Latin America 
 
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys. All index series are 
normalized in terms of the first year. 1992 for Female Labor Participation and preschool enrolment rate, 
2001for CCT beneficiaries and 2004 for tax compliance. 
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Figure 14 shows the effect sizes of changes in labor laws on the female labor supply. The 
results of empirical studies suggest that the effects of labor laws are mixed, with some 
finding that maternal leave is associated with an increase in women’s labor force 
participation, and others finding that other policies, such as unemployment insurance or 
minimum wage, are negatively associated with women’s labor force participation (see 
Section 3.7). Regardless, the effects appear to be small. 
 
Figure 14: Effect size of labor regulations on female labor supply 
* Semi-elasticity. Source: own calculations based literature analysis. 
Figure 15 shows the effect sizes of changes in taxation on the female labor supply. There is 
a positive relationship between tax reduction and female labor supply across a wide range 
of studies. Countries where these changes have been implemented (e.g., the US and 
Canada) have experienced an increase in female labor force participation (see Section 3.7). 
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Figure 15: Effect size of taxes on female labor supply 
* Semi-elasticity. Source: own calculations based literature analysis.  
As Figure 13 illustrates, CCTs have become very popular in Latin America. Figure 16 
summarizes the effect sizes of CCTs on the female labor supply. The analysis of the 
literature on the effects of the programs showed that the actual effect of CCTs on labor 
force participation must be empirically tested. In the US, the potential disincentives were 
the main reasons for the so-called welfare reform (Fiszbein et al., 2009). In Latin America, 
one set of impact evaluations of CCTs on the female labor supply mostly found small and 
insignificant effects. Regarding Mexico’s Progresa Program, there were no statistically 
significant effects on women’s labor force participation and hours worked (Alzúa et al., 
2012; Parker and Skoufias, 2000; Skoufias and di Maro, 2006). Nicaragua’s CCT program, 
Red de Protección Social, also had no effect on female labor force participation or number 
of hours worked (Maluccio and Flores, 2005). Another set of more recent evaluations found 
small negative effects. In Honduras, Novella et al. (2012) found a very small decrease in 
maternal labor participation (about 3 percentage points). Fernandez and Saldarriaga (2014) 
found a negative effect on female labor force participation in Peru. Similarly, three studies 
on Nicaragua found negative impacts of CCTs on the number of hours worked. A similar 
negative effect was found in Uruguay. Gasparini et al. (2015) found that an income transfer 
program in Argentina created a small disincentive to female labor force participation. 
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Finally, only one study found a small positive effect on the number of weekly hours worked 
(about 0.5 hours) by female beneficiaries of Progresa in Mexico (Alzúa et al., 2012). 
 
Figure 16: Effect size of CCTs on female labor supply 
* Semi-elasticity. Source: own calculations based literature analysis.  
Most of the effect sizes reported in Figure 16 cannot reject an effect of zero, although most 
of the estimates tend to be negative. Fiszbein et al. (2009) proposed that the very small or 
entire lack of effects of CCTs on the adult labor supply could be attributed to the very low 
income elasticity of leisure among poor households (the recipients of CCTs). Another 
reason could be that fulfilling the conditionalities creates costs for the household that equal 
or are higher than the amount of the transfer. In addition, it may be that the transfers 
received by the households are perceived as so temporary that the recipients do not believe 
there is a reason to change their labor supply behaviors. These mechanisms should operate 
differently over time. As CCT programs mature, program beneficiaries become accustomed 
to satisfy the conditionalities, and the cost of doing so decreases with time. Similarly, they 
start perceiving the transfer as permanent rather than temporary, allowing the income effect 
to dominate. In addition, Ribas and Veras (2011) found that a differential impact of 
receiving the transfer depended on place of residence. Although transfers negatively 
influenced women’s labor supply in urban areas, women’s labor supply in rural areas 
38 
 
reacted positively. CCT programs typically start in rural areas and later expand into urban 
areas; with time, the negative effect on labor supply should dominate. In sum, it is likely 
that the expansion of CCTs in the region did not cause a decrease in labor force 
participation when the programs were launched; however, the expansion seems to have 
halted the positive trend in female labor force participation in Latin America. 
On the other hand, preschool expansion is likely to have increased women’s participation in 
the labor force. Figure 17 summarizes the effect sizes of access to child care on the female 
labor supply.  
 
Figure 17: Effect sizes of child care on female labor supply 
* Semi-elasticity. Source: own calculations based literature analysis.  
The empirical studies tend to find a positive and relatively large effect on labor force 
participation or the number of weekly hours worked.18 Considering these results together 
with the expansion of child care provision in Latin America, it is reasonable to conclude 
that the expansion of these services has likely encouraged women to enter the labor force. 
                                                 
18 However, there are some exceptions. Contreras et al. (2010) found that extending the length of the school 
day reduced the number of hours worked by women in Chile. Using data for the US, Cascio (2006) found that 
public preschools for 5–6-year-old children did not affect the labor supply mothers with eligible children. The 
only effect is on more vulnerable populations.  
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4.2. Correlates of female labor supply 
Examining correlations in the data is an alternative method for studying the relative 
importance of the determinants of female labor supply. To do so, a panel dataset of 15 
countries was built for the period 1990–2010 and correlations were estimated using 
Ordinary Least Squares in the following model: 
 
∆𝑌𝑐𝑡 = 𝜃∆𝑍𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑐𝑡 + 𝜂𝑐 + 𝜀𝑐𝑡 
where ∆𝑌𝑐𝑡 is the annual change in the outcome 𝑌𝑐𝑡 of country c in year t, ∆𝑍𝑐𝑡 is the 
change in a plausible determinant of the female labor supply, 𝑋𝑐𝑡 is a vector that includes 
indicator variables for extrapolation and methodological changes in the surveys, and 𝜀𝑐𝑡 is 
the error term. Two outcomes of 𝑌𝑐𝑡 were examined: female labor force participation and 
average total numbers of hours worked by women. In addition, these measures were 
disaggregated by different characteristics (income, education, children in the household, 
and household structure). 
The vector 𝑍𝑐𝑡 includes: (1) the log of the average number of years of education, (2) the 
proportion of married women (or women living with a partner) aged between 18 and 55 
years, (3) the log of the women’s average number of children, (4) the log of fulltime wages, 
(5) the ratio of female to male wages, (6) the average age of children in the household, (7) 
the percentage of women responsible for an elderly person, (8) an index of children 
attending school,19 (9) an index of appliances in the household,20 (10) the percentage of 
married women that use contraception, (11) the percentage of non-practicing Catholics in 
the country, (12) GDP growth, and (13) an indicator variable of the presence of any CCT 
program in the country. Table 4 of the Appendix provides full details about the loading 
factors of the variables that were built using factor models. The standard errors were 
clustered at the country level. Table 5 shows the results.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 This index is based on a factor model that included the percentage of households with children enrolled at 
school, the net enrollment rates at preprimary and primary schools, and the gross enrollment rate at secondary 
schools. Table6.4 of the Appendix provides details on the estimations and properties of these indices. 
20 This index was created using a factor model that includes the percentage of households with various 
appliances (e.g., washing machine, car, motorcycle, and electricity). 
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Table 5: Correlates of the change in female labor force participation 
Panel dataset: 15 Latin American countries, 1990 -2010. Women aged18-55  
 
Notes: Each entry shows an estimate of the regression coefficient of a model of the annual change in female 
labor participation on each individual covariate. The table presents three main female participation measures: 
Rate of women’s labor participation, average total worked hours by women and percent women in part-time 
jobs. The table shows disaggregation of rate of female participation in population groups such as: quintile of 
income, education, number of children and household structure. Differences model includes fixed effects by 
country. CSA refers children’s legal starting school age and CFA refers legal children’s finishing school age, 
for more details look Bassi, Busso, and Muñoz (2015). Source: own calculations based on microdata from 
national household surveys. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parenthesis. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Education is positively related to female labor force participation, particularly for women in 
higher income households, single women, and women with young children. Marriage is not 
significantly correlated with participation. An increase in fertility tends to reduce 
participation, on average. This negative effect is present in all groups of women, except 
those in the first quintile of the income distribution. An increase in wages and a reduction 
in discrimination apparently induce women to be in the labor force, although the effects are 
not statistically significant. When children attend school, women tend to work more than 
 Quintil 
1
 Quintil 
5
Less than 
complete 
scondary
Secondary 
complete
Tertiary 
Complete
At least 1 
child age 
0
At least 1 
child age 
CSA to 
CFA
No 
children 
or 
children 
older 
than 
CFA
Nuclear 
Household
Single 
headed 
Household
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
Education
Ln (Years of Education) 12.597* -7.149 21.333* -- -- -- 16.104* 8.554 5.978 8.994 15.865** -1.886
(7.127) (12.890) (11.826) -- -- -- (9.273) (7.285) (7.853) (7.547) (7.775) (8.769)
Marriage & Fertility
Shared married women 18-55 -0.011 0.010 -0.038 0.006 -0.017 0.024 -0.041* -0.012 0.008 -0.018 0.024 0.035
(0.015) (0.035) (0.028) (0.018) (0.020) (0.025) (0.024) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.016) (0.038)
Ln (Number of children) -20.599*** 25.513* -37.742*** -9.834 -13.370 -6.938 -21.159** -16.530** -21.637*** -15.178** -21.512*** 7.046
(6.523) (14.703) (9.751) (8.445) (8.551) (7.951) (9.662) (8.098) (7.364) (7.507) (7.104) (9.693)
Labor Market Returns
Ln (Wages full time) 1.568 -2.381 7.299*** -0.617 0.661 3.021 1.453 0.473 2.320 1.315 1.306 -2.942
(1.875) (3.618) (2.596) (2.369) (2.330) (2.813) (2.755) (2.441) (1.899) (2.194) (1.663) (2.431)
Ratio wage women/men 2.608 5.983 4.722 2.264 -0.218 4.494 6.558* 3.780 3.493 2.649 1.209 -2.833
(2.942) (4.258) (4.034) (3.336) (3.678) (3.900) (3.498) (3.276) (3.254) (2.887) (3.050) (2.839)
Home Returns
Children in the school (Factor) 1.149 2.441 1.374 1.436 0.765 0.402 1.884* 1.597* 1.122 1.322 0.041 0.242
(0.785) (1.573) (1.050) (0.938) (0.977) (1.168) (1.074) (0.935) (0.909) (0.837) (0.860) (1.147)
% women in charge of old person -0.272 -0.217 -0.332 -0.388* -0.267 -0.226 -0.279 -0.393** -0.488** -0.228 -0.418** -0.076
(0.194) (0.326) (0.278) (0.231) (0.207) (0.257) (0.261) (0.187) (0.190) (0.209) (0.193) (0.300)
Average age children at households 2.502* -3.364 4.798** 1.316 4.324** 0.526 2.303 1.953 2.522* 1.457 2.416** -0.615
(1.369) (2.583) (2.068) (1.687) (1.703) (1.438) (1.651) (1.387) (1.488) (1.495) (1.172) (1.444)
Household Technology
Appliances in the household (Factor) 1.294* -0.969 2.873 0.378 0.909 0.938 1.703 0.922 0.641 1.220* 0.293 1.546
(0.751) (1.175) (1.869) (0.736) (0.999) (1.396) (1.115) (0.815) (0.932) (0.720) (1.144) (0.965)
Health Tecnologies
% women married/union using modern 0.382** 1.007** -0.073 0.488** 0.320 0.086 0.369 0.618*** 0.508*** 0.474** 0.064 0.283
contraceptive methods (0.162) (0.402) (0.310) (0.201) (0.231) (0.246) (0.246) (0.195) (0.186) (0.186) (0.215) (0.186)
Culture
Percent non-practising catholic 0.029 0.066 0.012 0.035 0.062** -0.004 0.036 0.028 0.044 0.024 0.047 -0.001
(0.028) (0.054) (0.043) (0.033) (0.029) (0.028) (0.038) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.029) (0.037)
Macro
GDP growth (annual %) -0.033* -0.128*** 0.022 -0.043* -0.012 -0.034 -0.064** -0.024 -0.021 -0.044** 0.008 0.007
(0.019) (0.044) (0.039) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.027) (0.024) (0.022) (0.021) (0.026) (0.022)
Policy
=1 with CCT program -0.609 0.094 -0.420 -0.353 -0.834 -0.223 -0.726 -0.571 -0.494 -0.496 -0.864 -1.562
(0.553) (0.967) (0.819) (0.665) (0.557) (0.568) (0.836) (0.763) (0.546) (0.592) (0.642) (1.429)
Covariates
Labor Force 
Participation
LFP by Income LFP by Women Education LFP by Women with children LFP by Household structure
Total 
Worked 
Hours
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when children are not attending school, suggesting that the expansion of preschools and 
schools in Latin America may have played an important part in the increase of the female 
labor supply. Moreover, a higher prevalence of home appliances in the household is 
associated with higher participation rates. Similarly, a higher prevalence of using modern 
contraceptive methods is positively correlated with the female labor supply. Culture is not 
correlated with the labor supply nor is the presence of a CCT program in the country. 
Finally, the effect of GDP is particularly important given how high GDP growth has been 
in the region since 2003. There is an overall negative and significant correlation between 
GDP growth and female labor force participation. Moreover, this negative correlation is 
much stronger for women in the lower quintile of the income distribution (of their 
husbands) and for less educated women. It is, thus, very likely that the recent stagnation in 
the increase of female labor force participation in the Latin America and the slower 
convergence between the participation of women in different groups can be partly 
explained by the higher rates of economic growth experienced in the region.  
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
Four major stylized facts of female labor supply were examined. First, there has been a 
long-term positive trend in female labor force participation. Second, there was virtually no 
change in the intensive margin (hours worked). Third, the region recently experienced 
stagnation in female labor force participation, and fourth, there has been some convergence 
between the disadvantaged (poor, less educated, and rural) and the advantaged (rich, more 
educated, and urban) groups within countries. However, this convergence also seems to 
have stopped in recent years. 
Using a general conceptual framework, a set of determinants was extracted that might 
influence female labor force participation, and the mechanisms that might explain those 
effects were analyzed. Some of these determinants are individual behaviors that are jointly 
determined (by the individuals) with labor supply, such as education, marriage, and fertility 
choices. Other determinants are outside the control of the individual, such as returns to 
work at home, returns to work outside the home for a wage, technologies (health, home, 
and work), preferences, and decision-making structures. Considering this framework, a 
review of the literature and cross-country regression analysis were performed to assess each 
determinant’s relative importance to explaining the factors. 
Table 6 summarizes the results. The positive long-term trends that began in the 1950s were 
likely driven by the expansion of health and home technologies and by cultural changes that 
operate over a long period. These two social changes, together with policies that expanded 
educational opportunities, increased educational attainment and reduced fertility, which had 
a positive feedback effect on female labor force participation. 
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Table 6: Summary of importance of determinants 
Determinants Change in Latin 
America 
between 1990 
and 2010 
Contributor 
to long-term 
(1950-2010) 
female labor 
supply 
increase 
Contributor to 
long-term (1990-
2010) female 
labor supply 
increase 
Contributor to 
convergence 
between 
advantage and 
disadvantaged 
group 
Contributor to 
recent 
stagnation 
Education Increased Likely Likely Likely Unlikely 
Marriage Stable Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely 
Fertility Decrease Likely Likely Likely Unlikely 
Technology      
Health (Contraceptives, 
Formula) 
Increase Likely Likely Unknown Unlikely 
Home (Appliances, 
electricity 
Increase Likely Unlikely Likely Unlikely 
Work (telework) Probably stable Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely 
Labor Returns      
Gender Discrimination Slight decrease, 
stagnated in 2000s 
Unlikely Likely Likely Likely 
Macroeconomic 
conditions 
-- Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Likely 
Policies      
Labor Regulations Stable Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely 
Taxation Stable (slight 
improvement in 
2000s) 
Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely 
CCTs Large increase 
since mid 1990s 
Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Likely 
Childcare Large increase Likely Likely Likely Unlikely 
Culture Better for women Likely Likely Likely Unlikely 
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys and literature analysis. 
 
Generally, these long-term trends continued through the 1990s. However, in the past three 
decades, there have been significant increases in the provision of subsidized child care, 
which likely explain the increase in female labor force participation over that period and the 
convergence between the female labor supply of poor and/or rural households with that of 
richer and/or urban households. The recent stagnation is likely caused in part by the higher 
rates of economic growth experienced in the region, the expansion of CCT programs and 
continuing gender discrimination in the region.  
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Female labor force participation statistics 
 
Notes: CSA refers children’s legal starting school age and CFA refers legal children’s finishing school age, 
for more details look Bassi, Busso, and Muñoz (2015). Source: own calculations based on microdata from 
national household surveys 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2nd Decile  9th Decile
Less than 
complete 
secondary
Secondary 
complete
Tertiary 
Complete
At least 1 
child age 0
At least 1 
child age 
CSA to 
CFA
No 
children or 
children 
older than 
CFA
Nuclear 
Household
Single headed 
Household
Early 1990s
Argentina 57.52 44.86 55.95 48.25 60.08 83.01 42.09 49.81 58.97 51.72 80.70 18.42
Bolivia 66.53 76.48 49.54 65.71 55.96 85.91 63.55 65.07 64.68 62.92 88.80 40.75
Brazil 61.65 57.57 52.78 57.14 72.34 86.04 56.93 60.60 59.79 57.73 76.69 20.94
Chile 45.29 24.99 44.14 35.72 50.64 76.23 32.08 37.24 41.76 39.74 70.88 46.00
Costa Rica 40.80 21.13 39.95 32.06 55.95 74.86 30.38 35.53 36.94 33.92 68.58 40.69
Ecuador 59.39 40.82 60.79 53.22 65.51 87.29 56.56 57.55 55.45 55.72 78.96 40.44
El Salvador 53.12 32.19 55.20 48.70 77.07 89.02 42.67 49.42 50.40 46.86 69.89 24.01
Honduras 41.08 27.24 40.92 34.75 67.76 78.79 33.60 36.72 39.71 35.01 61.26 45.78
Mexico 42.61 31.65 38.18 36.72 58.09 76.81 34.50 37.63 39.47 36.96 68.78 37.86
Nicaragua 55.71 32.85 51.06 51.93 73.09 89.98 48.54 51.80 54.02 48.59 78.58 48.12
Panama 49.54 26.46 55.31 34.87 65.89 87.42 38.96 44.46 47.52 43.22 70.70 40.44
Paraguay 58.06 36.16 57.22 52.73 70.84 87.61 49.96 53.49 54.30 53.05 79.25 25.00
Peru 71.42 66.33 67.58 69.70 67.77 84.47 67.40 70.61 70.56 68.91 88.22 41.21
Uruguay 68.20 57.07 63.91 62.43 79.85 94.28 61.73 64.18 64.31 64.83 86.15 39.67
Venezuela 52.61 33.65 50.33 43.85 65.88 87.12 43.50 47.35 47.93 45.86 73.77 39.08
LAC Average 54.90 40.63 52.19 48.52 65.78 84.59 46.83 50.76 52.39 49.67 76.08 36.56
Early 2010s
Argentina 68.10 50.98 70.07 55.17 67.54 88.85 57.26 62.00 70.56 62.88 85.97 21.73
Bolivia 74.73 73.27 63.71 74.29 68.61 86.29 66.59 73.51 77.21 70.65 90.22 45.03
Brazil 70.12 59.68 69.31 61.24 76.57 86.80 65.30 69.41 68.82 67.25 79.24 24.18
Chile 60.54 45.09 55.54 47.24 62.39 84.02 51.60 56.01 57.78 54.31 80.72 40.94
Costa Rica 58.61 39.68 58.34 48.14 68.32 86.78 47.30 52.25 56.43 51.92 77.24 40.00
Ecuador 63.01 47.57 57.22 55.30 65.74 88.20 54.14 59.41 60.90 57.18 85.26 39.35
El Salvador 60.94 41.14 57.70 54.99 72.33 88.73 48.86 58.48 60.47 55.17 74.95 43.01
Honduras 52.17 33.72 52.32 46.61 67.86 88.02 42.17 48.90 51.49 46.39 68.58 38.16
Mexico 55.67 41.72 49.63 49.43 62.14 79.22 42.97 50.92 54.63 50.33 76.68 39.87
Nicaragua 57.46 47.42 48.48 50.82 69.36 86.41 51.50 55.26 58.45 51.32 78.54 44.47
Panama 63.08 41.79 66.54 49.30 69.61 89.46 53.38 57.92 62.97 57.27 79.40 38.86
Paraguay 66.37 57.56 62.22 59.41 73.19 91.86 58.16 63.66 64.98 63.28 77.40 28.02
Peru 77.11 80.99 69.65 76.55 72.95 83.75 71.37 77.83 78.77 74.98 88.72 41.30
Uruguay 78.44 68.30 79.06 71.98 86.70 95.57 72.51 75.70 79.54 75.04 90.35 37.82
Venezuela 67.49 54.14 63.56 56.69 66.25 88.87 58.59 65.02 66.03 62.54 81.64 37.88
LAC Average 64.92 52.20 61.56 57.14 69.97 87.52 56.11 61.75 64.60 60.03 80.99 37.38
Labor Force 
Participation
LFP by Husband's Income LFP by  Education LFP by Fertility LFP by Household structure
Total 
Worked 
Hours
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Table 2.a:: Possible determinants 
 
Notes: Interpolated variables.  Appliances index includes data of wash machine, car, motorcycle and 
electricity. 
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys 
 
 
 
Average 
years of 
Education 
Number 
of 
Children
Shared 
Married 
Women
Contraceptive 
Prevalence
Households 
with 
electricity
Ratio wage 
(women/men)
Preschool 
enrolment 
rate
Catholic 
non-
practicing
Early 1990s
Argentina 10.70 1.89 93.08 52.06 99.61 0.99 48.82 57.66
Bolivia 6.60 2.91 73.25 19.30 71.86 0.78 34.23 56.52
Brazil 5.93 2.22 -- 67.48 92.13 0.77 54.61 47.35
Chile 9.40 2.05 63.54 51.82 96.17 0.77 89.75 49.62
Costa Rica 7.65 2.48 57.13 66.94 96.97 0.97 33.59 49.80
Ecuador 7.63 2.90 64.30 46.30 91.03 0.80 47.36 38.10
El Salvador 5.24 2.66 34.30 48.36 76.75 0.76 26.06 43.15
Honduras 5.45 3.19 57.40 38.78 70.09 0.91 13.75 37.33
Mexico 6.70 2.81 74.77 56.76 95.85 0.80 65.15 13.17
Nicaragua 4.96 3.31 60.35 50.26 76.21 0.86 16.45 34.02
Panama 9.36 2.33 39.22 52.44 -- 0.91 63.15 35.00
Paraguay 7.67 2.71 72.53 40.38 92.74 0.79 14.33 56.23
Peru 7.11 2.85 49.41 37.92 73.66 0.81 33.74 52.02
Uruguay 8.93 1.93 64.89 74.12 98.58 0.80 42.32 38.82
Venezuela 8.11 2.66 63.89 56.26 99.04 0.86 42.15 42.95
LAC Average 7.43 2.59 62.00 50.61 87.91 0.84 41.70 43.45
Early 2010s
Argentina 11.64 1.84 60.78 63.28 99.67 0.99 73.85 54.69
Bolivia 8.79 2.45 68.61 36.08 90.27 0.82 48.62 46.68
Brazil 8.63 1.54 78.62 75.78 99.35 0.84 64.01 36.90
Chile 11.19 1.77 52.69 60.52 99.76 0.81 99.34 42.35
Costa Rica 9.01 1.91 52.41 77.04 99.53 0.99 71.69 33.66
Ecuador 9.45 2.13 64.16 59.88 97.87 0.89 128.95 41.36
El Salvador 7.37 2.11 58.61 63.88 93.65 0.97 61.33 17.42
Honduras 6.44 2.59 55.72 61.70 82.07 0.87 42.35 25.62
Mexico 8.89 2.09 66.36 67.12 99.44 0.89 99.22 47.63
Nicaragua 6.66 2.50 57.95 74.12 79.76 0.90 54.97 26.61
Panama 10.75 1.98 66.83 50.02 -- 1.02 63.62 38.55
Paraguay 8.73 2.36 64.48 67.90 98.49 0.83 35.02 40.63
Peru 9.22 2.27 63.21 50.64 90.63 0.76 76.54 47.35
Uruguay 10.21 1.62 63.21 73.96 99.50 0.87 88.08 33.19
Venezuela 10.61 2.04 61.50 63.34 99.64 0.91 73.04 50.01
LAC Average 9.17 2.08 61.43 63.02 94.97 0.89 72.04 38.84
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Table 2.b: Possible determinants 
 
Notes: CCT beneficiaries for 2010. 
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maximum permitted 
work hours per week
Paternity 
leave 
(days)
Maternity 
leave 
(weeks)
Abortion law
Minimum 
percent 
overtime 
remuneration
Index 
hiring and 
wage 
regulation
s
CCT 
beneficiari
es 
(Millions)
Year 2012
Argentina 52 2 13 To protect mother's life, health & others 50 3.9 11.79
Bolivia 60 0 9 To protect mother's life, health & others 100 2.23 5.69
Brazil 46 5 17 Just to save mother's life 50 2.23 52.39
Chile 57 5 18 Not permitted 50 6.67 1.3
Costa Rica 72 0 17 To protect mother's life, health & others 50 2.23 0.19
Ecuador 52 10 12 To protect mother's life, health & others 50 5.57 6.13
El Salvador No universal national limit 0 12 Not permitted 100 6.67 0.57
Honduras 60 0 10 Not permitted 25 0 1.07
Mexico 57 0 12 Just to save mother's life 100 6.67 27.25
Nicaragua 57 0 12 Not permitted 100 6.67 --
Panama 57 0 14 Just to save mother's life 25 2.23 0.36
Paraguay 57 2 12 Just to save mother's life 50 5.57 0.55
Peru No universal national limit 4 13 To protect mother's life, health & others 25 3.9 2.59
Uruguay 56 3 12 To protect mother's life, health & others 100 6.67 0.76
Venezuela 46 14 18 Just to save mother's life 50 3.33 --
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Table 3: Literature review (effect sizes) 
 
ID Topic Subtopic Period Authors Sample
1 CCT
Programa de Asignación 
Familiar (PRAF)
2000-2002 Alzúa, Cruces and Ripani (2012) Females (adult)
2 CCT PROGRESA 1997-1999 Alzúa, Cruces and Ripani (2012) Females (adult). Rural. Round: 1998
3 CCT PROGRESA 1997-1999 Alzúa, Cruces and Ripani (2012) Females (adult). Rural. Round: 1999
4 CCT Red de Protección Social (RPS) 2000-2002 Alzúa, Cruces and Ripani (2012) Females (adult). Rural. Round: 2001
5 CCT Red de Protección Social (RPS) 2000-2002 Alzúa, Cruces and Ripani (2012) Females (adult). Rural. Round: 2002
6 CCT Elderly transfers 1993 Bertrand et al (2003)
Females relatives in three generation households with 
elderly 16-50 years old
7 CCT Ingreso Ciudadano 2006-2007 Borraz and Gonzales (2009) Females (22-55) w/children aged 6-14
8 CCT Ingreso Ciudadano 2006-2007 Borraz and Gonzales (2009) Females (22-55) w/children aged 6-14
9 CCT Juntos 2009 Fernandez and Saldarriaga (2014) All Females recipient of CCT
10 CCT Juntos 2009 Fernandez and Saldarriaga (2014) Married females recipient of CCT
11 CCT Juntos 2009 Fernandez and Saldarriaga (2014) Mothers recipient of CCT with children aged <5
12 CCT Red de Protección Social (RPS) 2000-2002 Maluccio and Flores (2005) Females (15+)
13 CCT
Programa de Asignación 
Familiar (PRAF)
2000-2002
Novella, Ripani, Cruces and Alzúa 
(2012)
Mother's in intact households
14 CCT PROGRESA 1997-1999
Novella, Ripani, Cruces and Alzúa 
(2012)
Mother's in intact households. Rural
15 CCT Red de Protección Social 2000-2001
Novella, Ripani, Cruces and Alzúa 
(2012)
Mother's in intact households. Rural
16 CCT PROGRESA 1997-1999 Parker and Skoufias (2000) Females (18-24)
17 CCT PROGRESA 1997-1999 Parker and Skoufias (2000) Females (25-34)
18 CCT PROGRESA 1997-1999 Parker and Skoufias (2000) Females (35-44)
19 CCT PROGRESA 1997-1999 Parker and Skoufias (2000) Females (45-54)
20 CCT PROGRESA 1997-1999 Parker and Skoufias (2000) Females (55+)
21 CCT Bolsa Familia 2001-2006 Ribas and Veras (2011) Females. Round=2004
22 CCT Bolsa Familia 2001-2006 Ribas and Veras (2011) Females. Round=2004
23 CCT Bolsa Familia 2001-2006 Ribas and Veras (2011) Females. Round=2004
24 CCT Bolsa Familia 2001-2006 Ribas and Veras (2011) Females. Round=2006
25 CCT Bolsa Familia 2001-2006 Ribas and Veras (2011) Females. Round=2006
26 CCT Bolsa Familia 2001-2006 Ribas and Veras (2011) Females. Round=2006
27 Child care Public child care provision 1991-2005
Bauernschuster and Schlotter 
(2013)
Mothers, youngest child born 1992-2000
28 Child care Preschool entrance age 1995-2001
Berlinski, Galiani and McEwan 
(2011)
Mothers
29 Child care Public Preschool 1950-1990 Cascio (2006) Single mother  5 or 6 years old , no younger children
30 Child care Public Preschool 1950-1990 Cascio (2006) Single mother  5 or 6 years old , old and younger children
31 Child care Public Preschool 1950-1990 Cascio (2006) married mother  5 or 6 years old , no younger children
32 Child care Public Preschool 1950-1990 Cascio (2006) married mother  5 or 6 years old , old and younger children
33 Child care longer school day 1990-2006
Contreras, Sepúlveda and Cabrera 
(2010)
Females (20-29)
34 Child care longer school day 1990-2006
Contreras, Sepúlveda and Cabrera 
(2010)
Females (20-65)
35 Child care longer school day 1990-2006
Contreras, Sepúlveda and Cabrera 
(2010)
Females (30-39)
36 Child care longer school day 1990-2006
Contreras, Sepúlveda and Cabrera 
(2010)
Females (40-49)
37 Child care longer school day 1990-2006
Contreras, Sepúlveda and Cabrera 
(2010)
Females (50-65)
38 Child care Preschool enrolment 1999 Gaux and Maurin (2010)
Mother youngest child born Dec95-Jan96 (Single mother 
families)
39 Child care Preschool enrolment 1999 Gaux and Maurin (2010)
Mother youngest child born Dec95-Jan96 (two -parent 
families)
40 Child care Preschool enrolment 1999 Gaux and Maurin (2010)
Mother youngest child born or Dec96-Jan97 (Single mother 
families)
41 Child care Preschool enrolment 1999 Gaux and Maurin (2010)
Mother youngest child born or Dec96-Jan97 (two -parent 
families)
42
Child care subsidized childcare 1997–2004
Lefebvre, Merrigan and Verstraete 
(2009)
Mothers with at least one child 6–11 and no children < 6
43 Child care public day care supply 2003-2008 Medrano (2009) Poor females (15-45) with children at most two years old
44 Child care free publicly provided child care 1987-1997
Nollenberger and Rodriguez-Planas 
(2011)
Mothers between 18 and 45 years. Excluded Pais Vasco and 
Navarra
45 Child care free publicly provided child care 1987-1997
Nollenberger and Rodriguez-Planas 
(2011)
Mothers between 18 and 45 years. Excluded Pais Vasco and 
Navarra
46 Child care free publicly provided child care 2007-2008
Paes de Barros, Olinto, Lunde and 
Carvalho (2011)
Mothers with children 0-3
47 Child care Public Preschool 1998-2003 Schlosser (2011) Mothers of children aged 2-4
48 Child care Public Preschool 1998-2003 Schlosser (2011) Mothers whose youngest child is aged 2-4
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ID Topic Subtopic Period Authors Sample
50 Crisis Added worker effect 1998-2002 Martinoty (2013) Married women on working age
51
Crisis Added worker effect
1993,1997,2000-
2007
Posadas and Sinha (2010)
Female spouse, both couple members below 95 years of age. 
No split  1997-2007. Women working because husband lost  
his job
52 Culture Second-generation Americans 1970 Fernandez (2006) Second-generation  married females, 30-40 years old
53 Culture Second-generation Americans 1970 Fernández and Fogli (2009) Married females, ages 30–40
54 Fertility More than 2 children 1990 Angrist and Evans  (1998) All mothers (21-35) with at least 2 children
55 Fertility More than 2 children 1980 Angrist and Evans  (1998) All mothers (21-35) with at least 2 children
56 Fertility More than 2 children 1980 Angrist and Evans  (1998) Married mothers (21-35) with at least 2 children
57 Fertility More than 2 children 1990 Angrist and Evans  (1998) Married mothers (21-35) with at least 2 children
58 Fertility Early access to the pill 1970-1990 Bailey  (2006) Females (21-25)
59 Fertility Early access to the pill 1970-1990 Bailey  (2006) Females (26-30)
60 Fertility Early access to the pill 1970-1990 Bailey  (2006) Females (31-35)
61 Fertility Early access to the pill 1970-1990 Bailey  (2006) Females (36-40)
62 Fertility Early access to the pill 1970-1990 Bailey  (2006) Females (41-44)
63 Fertility Abortion laws
1960-2000 (5 
Years)
Bloom, Canning, Fink and Finlay 
(2007)
Females (15-19)
64 Fertility Abortion laws
1960-2000 (5 
Years)
Bloom, Canning, Fink and Finlay 
(2007)
Females (20-24)
65 Fertility Abortion laws
1960-2000 (5 
Years)
Bloom, Canning, Fink and Finlay 
(2007)
Females (25-29)
66 Fertility Abortion laws
1960-2000 (5 
Years)
Bloom, Canning, Fink and Finlay 
(2007)
Females (30-34)
67 Fertility Abortion laws
1960-2000 (5 
Years)
Bloom, Canning, Fink and Finlay 
(2007)
Females (35-39)
68 Fertility Abortion laws
1960-2000 (5 
Years)
Bloom, Canning, Fink and Finlay 
(2007)
Females (40-44)
69 Fertility Abortion laws
1960-2000 (5 
Years)
Bloom, Canning, Fink and Finlay 
(2007)
Females (45-49)
70 Fertility Abortion laws
1960-2000 (5 
Years)
Bloom, Canning, Fink and Finlay 
(2007)
Females (50-54)
71 Fertility Abortion laws
1960-2000 (5 
Years)
Bloom, Canning, Fink and Finlay 
(2007)
Females (55-59)
72 Fertility Abortion laws
1960-2000 (5 
Years)
Bloom, Canning, Fink and Finlay 
(2007)
Females (60-64)
73 Fertility
In vitro fertilization (IVF) 
treatment
1994-2005
Lundborg, Plug and Würtz 
Rasmussen (2014)
All Females who received at least one IVF treatment
74 Fertility
In vitro fertilization (IVF) 
treatment
1994-2005
Lundborg, Plug and Würtz 
Rasmussen (2014)
All Females who received at least one IVF treatment
81 Macro Financial crisis 2001-2002 McKenzie (2003a) Female (25-60)  Participation Female (25-55) Hours
82 Macro Development/GDP 1890-2005 Olivety (2013) Female
84 Macro Financial crisis 1980–2005
Signorelli,Choudhry and Marelli 
(2012)
Female
85 Macro Financial crisis 1980–2005
Signorelli,Choudhry and Marelli 
(2012)
Female
86 Macro Financial crisis 1980–2005
Signorelli,Choudhry and Marelli 
(2012)
Female
88 Marriage Divorce laws 1994-2001 Bargain (2012) Married females
90 Marriage Added worker effect 1979-1981 Blau and Kahn (2004) Married females age 24-54 with spouse with age 24 - 54
91 Marriage Added worker effect 1999-2001 Blau and Kahn (2004) Married females age 24-54 with spouse with age 24 - 54
92 Marriage Added worker effect 1989-1991 Blau and Kahn (2004) Married females age 24-54 with spouse with age 24 - 54
93
Marriage Spouse health coverage 1989-2000 Cebi (2013)
Married women with intact marriage 1989-2000  her age 
and her husband age 25-64, health insurance info available  
not covered public health insurance
94 Marriage Health Insurance 1979-1985 Chou and Staiger (2001)
Married women ages 20-65 whose husbands are paid 
employees
95 Marriage Increase demand women work 1950 Goldin and Olilvetti (2013)
White women 25-34 with 12 or more years education, in 
their first  marriage, no farming
96 Marriage Increase demand women work 1950 Goldin and Olilvetti (2013)
White women 25-34 with 12 or more years education, in 
their first  marriage, no farming
97 Marriage Increase demand women work 1950 Goldin and Olilvetti (2013)
White women 25-34 with 12 or more years education, in 
their first  marriage, no farming
98 Marriage 1998-2002 Lee (2008) Women between 19 and 32
99 Policies minimum wage regulation 1970-2008 Addisson and Ozturk (2012) Females (25-54)
100 Policies Parental leave 1990-2010 Blau and Kahn (2013) Females (25-54)
107
Policies
Unemployment insurance during 
husband's unemployment spell
1984-1992 Cullen and Gruber (2000) Married females with unemployed husbands
108 Policies Added worker effect 1994-2009 Gaux (2014)
Married or cohabiting individual aged 18-65, spouse wage 
earner
109 Policies Maternal Leave 1985-1999 Jaumotte (2003) Women 25-54 years
110 Policies Tax reduction 1985-1999 Jaumotte (2003) Women 25-54 years
111 Policies Anti-discrimination law 1968-1979 Mukhopadhyay (2012) Pregnant women
112 Policies Maternal Leave 1999-2010 Rossin-Slater et al (2011) Women with a youngest children in the households
113 Policies Maternal Leave 1999-2010 Rossin-Slater et al (2011) Women with a youngest children in the households
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Source: own calculations based literature analysis. 
 
Table 4: Factor analysis 
 
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys. 
 
ID Topic Subtopic Period Authors Sample
114 Policies Maternal Leave 1999-2010 Rossin-Slater et al (2011) Women with a youngest children in the households
117
Taxes
Reform replaced a spousal tax 
exemption with a nonrefundable 
tax credit
1986-1991 Crossley and Jeon (2006) Females married to higher income husbands
118 Taxes Tax reduction / Transfer 1985-1997 Eissa & Hoynes (2004)
Married wives couples residing in the same household 25-54 
years old
119 Taxes Tax reduction 1984-1992 Eissa (2002) Married females, high-income
121 Taxes
reduction in effective marginal 
tax rate
1986-1991 Jeon (2004) Females married to higher income husbands
122 Technology and Infrastructure household appliances 1940-1950 Cardia (2010) Females
123 Technology and Infrastructure household appliances 1940-1950 Cardia (2010) Females
124 Technology and Infrastructure household appliances 1940-1950 Cardia (2010) Females
125 Technology and Infrastructure household appliances 1960-1970 Coen-Priani et al (2010) Married females (18-55), white
126 Technology and Infrastructure Internet 2000-2009 Dettling (2014) Married females (18-59)
127 Technology and Infrastructure rural electrification 1998-2005 Grogan and Sadanand (2012) Female (20-55)
128 Technology and Infrastructure Commuting time
1980-1990-
2000
Kalesnikova (2007) White married women with children none  under 5 H School
129 Technology and Infrastructure Commuting time
1980-1990-
2000
Kalesnikova (2007) White married women with children none under 5 H collage
130 Technology and Infrastructure Commuting time
1980-1990-
2000
Kalesnikova (2007) White married women with children under 5 High School
131 Technology and Infrastructure Commuting time
1980-1990-
2000
Kalesnikova (2007) White married women with children under 5 High collage
132 Technology and Infrastructure Commuting time
1980-1990-
2000
Kalesnikova (2007) White married women, No children High School
133 Technology and Infrastructure Commuting time
1980-1990-
2000
Kalesnikova (2007) White married women, No children collage
